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FROM PROMISE TO FORM:
HOW CONTRACTING ONLINE
CHANGES CONSUMERS
DAVID A. HOFFMAN*
I hypothesize that different experiences with online contracting have led some consumers to see contracts—both online and offline—in distinctive ways. Experimenting on a large, nationally representative sample, this paper provides evidence
of age-based and experience-based differences in views of consumer contract formation and breach. I show that younger subjects who have entered into more
online contracts are likelier than older ones to think that contracts can be formed
online, that digital contracts are legitimate while oral contracts are not, and that
contract law is unforgiving of breach.
I argue that such individual differences in views of contract formation and enforceability might lead firms to discriminate among consumers. There is some evidence
that businesses are already using variance in views of contract to induce consumers
to purchase goods they would not otherwise have. I conclude by suggesting how the
law might respond to such behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Contracting has never flourished more than it does today. Consumers see a larger number of contracts daily than they used to, with
longer terms and under novel conditions.1 In an online “orgy of contract formation,”2 firms have seized new opportunities to shift risks to
consumers by imposing unread terms.3 The result is that “most of us
make more legal agreements in a year than our grandparents made in
a lifetime.”4
Contract scholars have spent the last generation arguing about
what this digitization and proliferation of contracts means for contract
doctrine.5 They’ve spent almost no time on a question of equal significance: How do changing habits of contract formation transform consumers?6 That is, it seems likely that repeatedly clicking-to-agree to an
1 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 705–08 (2011) (describing the role of contracts in the life of a
hypothetical consumer); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563–64 (2008)
(estimating $781 billion in lost productivity if individuals actually read privacy policies, at
244 hours per year).
2 Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2011).
3 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS, introductory cmt. (AM.
LAW INST., Reporters’ Revised Draft of Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016) (noting that
consumers do not read disclosed terms); NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS 59 (2013)
(“Contracts are much more ubiquitous online than in the physical world.”); Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2014)
(presenting the results of a study in which consumers visited the End-User License
Agreement pages for 0.08% of paid and 0.22% of freeware retailers).
4 Eric Felten, Postmodern Times: Are We All Online Criminals?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,
2011, at D8.
5 For a useful literature review and a new proposed solution, see Ian Ayres & Alan
Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545,
555–62 (2014).
6 Exceptions include Brett Frischmann, Thoughts on Techno-Social Engineering of
Humans and the Freedom to Be Off (or Free from Such Engineering), 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 535, 558 (2016) (arguing that technological conditions of contracting change
our expectations of consent and make it mindless) and David A. Hoffman & Zev J. Eigen,
Contract Consideration and Behavior, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
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explicit lie (affirming you have read the contract’s terms)7 makes consumers feel somewhat differently about contract formation. Moreover, while contracts offline are typically concluded with someone else
in the room—engendering a feeling of moral exchange, or at least
norms of reciprocity—digital contracts are almost always entered into
with a faceless, sterile, corporate counterparty.8 Thus, though popular
culture routinely valorizes the ritual and significance of signing paper
contracts,9 digital contracts are increasingly the subject of satire.10
Repeated experiences with these distinct, digital, sterile instruments
of exchange should leave a mark.
To examine the intuition that changing contract practices affect
views about contracting, this Article looks at how contracting parties
(manuscript at 7–8), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567830
(examining how contract formation affects consumer behavior). In the literature on the
“psychological contract” that studies employees’ implicit views toward organizational
rules, there is a small set of papers on this problem, as researchers have hypothesized
generational differences in how employees perceive work rules and norms. See, e.g.,
Xander D. Lub et al., Why Do Generational Differences in Psychological Contracts Exist?,
in GENERATIONAL DIVERSITY AT WORK 37, 42–46 (Emma Parry ed., 2014).
7 See David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate Contracts? Richard Posner
and Evan Chesler Don’t; Do You?, ABOVETHELAW.COM (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://
abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richardposner-doesnt-do-you/ (providing anecdotal evidence that prominent legal minds sign
contracts without reading them); South Park: HumancentiPad (Comedy Partners television
broadcast Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.hulu.com/watch/249969 (satirizing the premise that
consumers read the iTunes terms of use:
“Guard: You can’t agree by accident. There’s a fail-safe built in. Even if you
click on ‘Agree’ another little window pops up that says ‘Are you sure you
agree?’ and you have to click on ‘Agree’ again.
Woman: Uh, what are you going to do to us?
Guard: Everything that you agreed to in the iTunes conditions.
Kyle: We didn’t read them!
Guard: Heh! Right. Who just agrees to something they don’t read?”).
8 For evidence that contracts with firms are more likely to be seen as morally inert
than contracts with individuals, see Uriel Haran, A Person-Organization Discontinuity in
Contract Perception: Why Corporations Can Get Away with Breaking Contracts But
Individuals Cannot, 59 MGMT. SCI. 2837, 2850–51 (2013).
9 The degree of reverence is obviously situational. But even the crassest corners of
popular culture treat signature to a paper contract as being a venerable moment. See, e.g.,
WWE, Hulk Hogan & Andre the Giant’s Wrestlemania III Contract Signing, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 8, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzcMnD3-XDM (depicting the signing
of a wrestling contract as a significant moment).
10 See, e.g., Nation Shudders at Large Block of Uninterrupted Text, THE ONION (Mar. 9,
2010), http://www.theonion.com/article/nation-shudders-at-large-block-of-uninterruptedte-16932 (“Some have speculated that the never-ending flood of sentences may be a news
article, medical study, urgent product recall notice, letter, user agreement, or even a
binding contract of some kind.”); SCOTT ADAMS, DILBERT (Feb. 24, 2011), http://
dilbert.com/strip/2011-02-24 (satirizing fine print); SCOTT ADAMS, DILBERT (Feb. 23,
2011), http://dilbert.com/strip/2011-02-23 (same); SCOTT ADAMS, DILBERT (Jan. 14, 1997),
http://dilbert.com/strip/1997-01-14 (same); South Park, supra note 7 (satirizing consumers
not reading online contracts).
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of different ages understand formation, performance, and breach. I
hypothesize that younger subjects will have distinct views about contract in part because most of the agreements they have entered have
been digital. I test the theory through a series of scenario experiments
using a nationally representative sample of over 1000 American
adults, ranging in age from 18 to 90. I find that younger subjects are
more likely to believe that:
• Contracts can be formed online;
• Contracting out of rights in writing is legitimate in ways that
oral contracting is not;
• Contract law is highly formal and does not permit humane
excuses for breach.
One way to think about this varied set of behaviors is to surmise
that younger consumers process contracting through a new and somewhat distinctive contractual schema.11 Compared to older consumers,
younger ones have come to be somewhat less likely to think that contracts instantiate moral exchanges,12 and more likely to believe they
are merely the rules of the game. In the daily exercise of clicking-toagree, one should try to chisel and push and shop around whenever
possible, because “contracts” are nothing but formal terms that stand
in the way of consumption.
These findings have several implications. They call into question
popular perceptions about millennials’ fear of commitment.13
Whatever it is fair to say generally about generational differences,14 I
do not find evidence that younger subjects are against contracts or
11 Suchman’s account of contracts’ role as “symbolic markers” heavily influenced my
thinking here, although he does not speculate as I do about differences between
contracting parties. See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 91, 100, 128 (2003) (stating that “contracts convey identifiable cultural
messages”).
12 Cf. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics
in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 420–23 (2009) (discussing findings
of an empirical study that found that subjects attributed importance to the moral
dimensions of breach).
13 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Fear of Commitment, Economy Drive Generation Y
Shopping Patterns, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/04/24/fear-of-commitment-economy-drive-generation-y-shopping-patterns.
14 They are, largely, bunk, but illuminating nonetheless. See generally DANAH BOYD,
IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 14–16 (2014) (describing
historical fears surrounding the introduction of new technologies). Of course, the idea that
there is such a thing as a “generational” perspective is itself contested. Perhaps what is
being observed is an age effect. See Lub et al., supra note 6, at 40–41 (noting the
methodological difficulty in studying and generalizing about generational cohorts); Sue
Shaw & David Fairhurst, Engaging a New Generation of Graduates, 50 EDUC. & TRAINING
366, 367 (2008) (discussing the lack of consensus among researchers regarding generational
differences).
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contracting: Rather, they see these social practices slightly differently.
To illustrate the practical upshot of age-based differences, I investigate “no contract” clauses, such as those common in cellphone advertisements. I show that such increasingly popular contracting labels
actually appeal most to older consumers, who—relatively more convinced of the moral worth of contracts—are attracted by the idea of
consumer relationships which can be freely exited. Younger subjects,
who are less likely to think that breach entails a moral or social cost,
simply do not care that something is labeled “contract” or “no
contract.”
Differences in lay views of contract based on age have implications beyond the “no contract” scenario. I posit that age differences in
contract could (and may already) be leading firms to discriminate
between consumers based on their age and thus their views about
what constitutes a contract. Unlike discrimination based on cognitive
style or heuristics, such identity-based contracting is plausible, and
maybe inevitable, in a world where Internet cookies permit firms to
know their consumers’ demographic profile at the point of sale.
To be concrete (and to foreshadow Part III), imagine that a firm
would like some consumers to feel that an Internet privacy policy is
binding without making it an actual contract. It can distinguish
between older and younger consumers using readily available Internet
tracking technology, and provide different contracting environments
based on consumers’ (distinct) views about what constitutes formation. This would seem to open the possibility of discrimination
between consumers, not based on individual differences in cognitive
style, but rather demographically based variation regarding the social
meaning of contract. Should the law do something about it? As
younger readers might say, RAFO.15
Part I of this paper motivates the hypothesis that consumers will
have different views about contract based on their age. Part II
describes five experiments I conducted using online subjects that
examined the effect of a variety of individual differences on contract
formation and enforceability. Part III describes the implications of
these results.

15 Read and find out. The acronym arose out of repeated answers by Robert Jordan,
the pseudonym for now-deceased fantasy author James Rigney, to fan questions about his
epic fantasy fiction series, The Wheel of Time. See Chat with Robert Jordan, WHEEL OF
TIME WIKI (Nov. 1, 1998), http://wot.wikia.com/wiki/Source:Scifi.com_chat,_1_November_
1998. As it turns out, Rigney died before the unsatisfying answers to those questions would
be revealed by an author contracted to finish the series by his estate. Thus, authors should
use the expression with care, lest they promise more than they deliver, or die trying.
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CONTRACT

Digitization necessarily disrupts doctrine generated by a world of
paper and in-person exchange.16 Some kinds of shifts make doctrine
virtually obsolete—the mailbox rule, governing dispatch and delayed
receipt of acceptance, is now effectively a dead letter.17 Others hollow
out rules without ever formally upturning them.18 It is a surprising
(though sometimes-appreciated)19 fact that despite the recent transformation of consumer contracting’s context from rare paper transactions to ubiquitous digital ones, almost nothing about the content of
contract doctrine on formation has changed over the last three generations. We still measure formation by “reasonable notice,” we focus
on “conspicuous” terms, police terms rarely, and insist that consumers
have a “duty to read.”20
But the world has changed. This Part examines the tectonic shifts
in practice and people that lie under the surface of doctrine, focusing
first on contracting practices and then on contracting parties.
A. Changes in Contract Practice
The degree to which contract law now operates on a different set
of social practices can be illustrated by looking, serially, at the cases—
and the fact patterns—that preoccupied successive generations of consumer contract theorists.21 Each worried about standard form con16 See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans,
Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000).
17 See Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 200, 202 (2009) (“The very name of the ‘mailbox rule’ conjures up its dated origins,
raising the question whether nineteenth-century jurists would have sanctioned its
application in technological contexts far beyond their wildest imaginations.”).
18 The battle of the forms under U.C.C. § 2-207, for instance, offers solutions to a set of
problems that is now rare (paper forms exchanged nonsimultaneously) without answering
a still urgent commercial problem (nonmatching terms) that remains problematic.
19 See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet
Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L.
REV. 452, 470 (2013) (concluding after a review of doctrinal developments prompted by
technological change that the “common law of contracts proved more than resilient
enough to handle the problems of the new era with ease”).
20 See 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.12 (rev. ed. 2002)
(describing the duty-to-read rule as founded on “bargaining practices of the past, when the
self-reliance ethic was strong and standardized agreements were rare”).
21 Warranties offer a separate set of problems: (1) Historically they were not part of the
actual sales contract between the buyer and the seller, and (2) they are usually advertised
as an important part of what the consumer is buying. Such documents have been a
preoccupation of policymakers since at least the 1950s, when complaints about car
manufacturers were rife. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE & FIN. OF THE H.
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 93D CONG., STAFF REPORT ON
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tracts,22 which have been seen at least since the 1970s as the typical
type of consumer contract.23 But each focused on a distinct set of contracting practices, and, consequently, their normative prescriptions
differed.
The first generation, extant from the 1950s through 1980s, is best
represented by the famous 1960s case generated by Ora Lee
Williams’s stereo.24 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was a
case nominally about the application by analogy of the Uniform
Commercial Code’s provision on unconscionability to a crosscollateralization clause in a standard form consumer contract. But for
scholars who hotly debated its importance, it was a fact pattern
infused with issues of race,25 and raised the legitimacy of a “law of the
poor.”26 That is, what kinds of problems did standard form contracting
practices create for vulnerable consumers, who might be compelled to
contract by monopolies who sent out domineering salesmen to their
very apartment doors.27 Jurists, focusing on whether the words used
CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES 7–9 (1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 31317, 31318
[hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (discussing history of congressional action respecting
warranties); FED. TRADE COMM’N ET AL., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON APPLIANCE
WARRANTIES AND SERVICE 100–07 (1969), as reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 26–28
(1974) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. It is also the case that the law (in the early
1970s) was apparently trending away from holding any of the disclaimers in such
documents enforceable. See STAFF REPORT, supra, at 5. At least in the 1960s, warranties
were “printed on good quality paper with a filigree border.” TASK FORCE REPORT, supra,
at 39.
22 Indeed, contract scholars have worried about standard form contracts in the
consumer context over the entire post-WWII era. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943);
K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 393–404
(1937); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679.
23 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003) (“[N]early all commercial and
consumer sales contracts are form driven.”); Slawson, supra note 22, at 529–30 (describing
the ubiquity of form contracts in the consumer context).
24 See 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 659 (3d ed. 2010)
(citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965))
(describing Walker-Thomas as “still the most famous unconscionability case of all”).
25 See Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 306
(1994) (arguing that the court’s decision pushes readers into thinking in terms of ingrained
racial stereotypes while obscuring structural influences of racism).
26 See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,”
102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (quoting Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright, J., D.C. Cir.,
to William E. Shipley, The Lawyers Coop. Publ’g Co. (July 12, 1967) (on file with the New
York University Law Review)).
27 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1177–78 (1983) (pointing out that “the most famous academic and judicial
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were conspicuous or confusing, worked to find a way not to enforce
such contracts without disturbing the ordinary run of consumer agreements.28 Thus, “consumer contract law” focused on contracting practices that vitiated the ordinary intuition that consumers had in fact
executed legitimate agreements. Unconscionability doctrine, because
it threatened to creep outside of this narrow context, worried contract
scholars, even as it motivated others.29
Despite this focus on the terms of a narrow band of written consumer contracts, many consumer contracts in the past were implicit
and unwritten—though disclaimers of warranty for certain goods were
and remain common.30 Rather, the typical contract transpired through
“paperless over-the-counter or off-the-shelf cash sale.”31 The absence
of explicit contract is particularly salient in the intellectual property
context,32 but is true more globally. Think about a Hollywood movie
from the 1950s through 1990s. Did the main character sign away his or
her rights before hiring a taxi,33 buying a book,34 booking a hotel
room,35 buying clothes,36 or picking up medication at the local store?37
treatments of the subject [of consumer standard form contracts] assumed a close
connection between the use of contracts of adhesion and the exercise of monopoly
power”).
28 See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (famously describing U.C.C. § 2-302 as lacking
coherence and proposing a procedural and substantive approach).
29 See Fleming, supra note 26, at 1403–04; Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an
Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 681–82
(2012) (discussing the relationship between technological change and Walker-Thomas).
30 Cf. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 141 n.35 (1970) (“I
have no empirical evidence that the frequency of this type of transaction [a consumer
standard form contract] has increased, over, say, the last fifty years or so. But most people
seem to assume so, and it seems certainly reasonable (given the increase in marketer
concentration) to believe that it did.” (citation omitted)).
31 Id. at 131 n.1.
32 See, e.g., Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 99 (2006)
(describing the rise of licensing of chattels tied to intellectual property).
33 Compare Movieclips, Breakfast at Tiffany’s (8/9) Movie Clip – The Only Chance at
Real Happiness (1961) HD, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=L_TvaJulWx0#action=share, with Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://
www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
34 Compare Movieclips, Notting Hill (1/10) Movie Clip – Can I Have Your Autograph?
(1999) HD, YOUTUBE (June 27, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArlsU2_cUbg,
with Conditions of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?ie=UTF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0&nodeId=508088 (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
35 Compare The Graduate—Hotel Scene, YOUTUBE (Mar. 18, 2012), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=7MeyTgT3Or4, with Website Terms of Use, EXPEDIA, https://www.
expedia.com/p/info-other/legal.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
36 Compare Julia Roberts—Pretty Woman—Shopping Scene, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0Suo8Gshk4, with Terms of Use, OLD NAVY,
http://oldnavy.gap.com/customerService/info.do?cid=3319 (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
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The concerns of “consumer contracting” simply didn’t apply to vast
swathes of ordinary consumption.
If Williams was about particularly bad, but central, terms pushed
in person, the second generation’s emblem, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
focuses on nonsalient terms in an increasingly long common printed
consumer form.38 Hill asks whether terms that arrive after a customer’s order are binding, and starts with Judge Easterbrook’s statement of the facts:
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives a
credit card number. Presently a box arrives, containing the computer and a list of terms, said to govern unless the customer returns
the computer within 30 days. Are these terms effective as the parties’ contract, or is the contract term-free because the order-taker
did not read any terms over the phone and elicit the customer’s
assent?39

The case continues to generate scholarly ferment: Are laterarriving terms wrapped into the original offer? What is the original
offer when the customer calls the firm anyway? Were Judge
Easterbrook’s assumptions about market rationality correct?
Shouldn’t we simply find that the contract is formed when the consumer pays, thereby cutting off the offending following terms at the
source? Indeed, Hill may be the most criticized contracts case of the
last twenty-five years.40
But readers of the facts in both Williams and Hill now understand them to describe a consumer universe that today barely exists.41
Door-to-door furniture sales are all but extinct. Even Hill, not yet
twenty years old, is musty with age. The sequence described—where
37 Compare Movieclips, $20 Bill—Paper Moon (5/8) Movie Clip (1973) HD, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKJJbZe4TWM, with Terms &
Conditions, RITEAID, https://shop.riteaid.com/info/legal-information/terms-conditions (last
visited Sept. 14, 2016).
38 See 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general . . . .”); cf. Klocek v. Gateway,
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340–41 (D. Kan. 2000) (ruling that the customer was not bound
by Gateway’s standard terms absent evidence that the initial sales transaction was
conditional on their acceptance).
39 Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1148.
40 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair
and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1819–23 (2000); Shubha Ghosh, Where’s
the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, 16
TOURO L. REV. 1125 (2000); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
743, 752–56 (2002); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 905 n.193 (2002).
41 See Peppet, supra note 29, at 681–82 (hypothesizing that Williams, if shopping today,
would do so on an iPhone).
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one phones in an order and talks to a person, whose firm then ships
goods with paper terms in a physical box—simply is not a recognizable part of the gestalt of modern consumer culture.
Today’s scholars worry about a different kind of contracting context.42 A (platonic) consumer contract now begins by selecting an app
on our smartphones, successively clicking a “buy now” button and an
“I agree” terms and conditions box, before using our fingerprints to
evidence payment.43 The product arrives within a day (sometimes that
same day). There is a welter of terms, but they are never printed out.
Negotiation is impossible: Consumer contracting is boilerplate all the
way down.44 That is, the third generation doesn’t worry about particularly egregious terms and in-person bullying (as in Williams) or the
problem of assent and arrival being distinct when the parties are apart
(as in Hill) but rather the sheer bloat of digital terms in the digital
setting.
Bloat is, indeed, a problem. In 1975, Congressional investigators
reported that warranties for consumer goods between 300 and 600
words (total!) were too long and could be “written more clearly and
more briefly.”45 In 1977, Jeffrey Davis, lamenting the length of consumer credit contracts and experimentally testing the effect of
reducing their length, described a “typical” credit card contract of
1100 words over “one and three-quarters legal-size pages in singlespace eight-point type.”46 Modern credit card agreements can reach
20,000 words (or, about as long as this law review article, including
notes).47 In one study of all the contracts which one had to agree to
when buying a computer, James Gibson found that the “average computer purchase binds the consumer to twenty-five contracts, comprising 74,897 words of boilerplate.”48 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and
Robert Taylor, studying changes in End User License Agreements
42 An example of the field is Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online
Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1335–37 (2011) (describing the rise of wrap agreements
and the new online contracting context).
43 See Chloe Rigby, More than 40% of Ecommerce Sales Now from Mobile: IMRG,
INTERNET RETAILING (Feb. 24, 2015), http://internetretailing.net/2015/02/more-than-40-ofecommerce-sales-now-from-mobile-imrg/ (finding that forty percent of online sales were
recently estimated to be made on cellphones rather than traditional desktops).
44 See James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 163 (2013)
(explaining that boilerplate contracts leave no room for negotiation).
45 STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 12.
46 Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841,
866 (1977).
47 Alan Siegel & Irene Etzkorn, When Simplicity Is the Solution, WALL STREET J.
(Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324000704578386652879032
748.
48 Gibson, supra note 44, at 190.
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(EULAs) from 2003 to 2010, found that EULAs increased in length
by 27% without becoming more readable or friendlier to consumers.49
(Indeed, most terms got relatively worse for buyers.)50
Of course, almost no one reads any of these additional, increasingly long contracts.51 Our best estimate is that “only one or two in
1,000 shoppers access a product’s EULA for at least 1 second.”52 To
make the point, researchers required consumers to click-to-agree to
terms of use for a wireless hotspot: Non-reading subjects (blithely)
agreed to give up their first-born child to gain Internet access.53 Other
consumers have agreed to sell their soul in return for a video game.54
Given these readership rates, we shouldn’t be surprised that although
contracting terms are in theory part of the product they regulate,55
studies have shown that they are not typically amenable to competitive pressures.56
If consumers read any text in a modern consumer contract, it is
this: “I have read and agree to the terms of use,” which the Urban
Dictionary correctly defines as “[p]retty much the biggest lie on the
planet.”57 Or to put it differently, consumer contracts today are
increasingly common and long, and they always require consumers to
knowingly affirm a whopper.
To be fair, online sales remain dwarfed by their brick-and-mortar
counterparts. From 2000 to 2014, e-commerce increased eleven fold,
49 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in
Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 253 (2013).
50 See id. at 257. But see Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The
Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 999–1000 (2008) (finding
the contract terms of large Internet retailers were “surprisingly benign”).
51 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 165, 179–81 (2011); Bakos et al., supra note 3, at 3.
52 Bakos et al., supra note 3, at 3.
53 Agata Blaszczak-Boxe, Give Up Firstborn for Free Wi-Fi? Some Click ‘I Agree,’
CNET (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/give-up-firstborn-for-free-wi-fi-someclick-i-agree/.
54 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls.html.
55 See Leff, supra note 30, at 146–47 (describing adhesion contracts as part of “a
unitary, purchased bundle, of which the product, say a car, is just the most tangible” part).
56 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
450–51 (2008) (finding no correlation between the favorability of contract terms and
competitive conditions).
57 I Have Read and Agree to the Terms of Use, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=I+have+read+and+agree+to+the+terms+of+use
(last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
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but even so constitutes only about 7% of all retail sales.58 That said,
computers and electronics are more typically bought online; health
and beauty products (as well as furniture) offline.59 About 70% of
Americans regularly buy online, and digital purchases are expected to
comprise about 11% of all sales by 2018.60 And for millennials the
numbers are much higher; about 25% of all millennial consumer dollars were spent online in 2015.61
B. Do Distinct Contracting Practices Change Views of Contract?
Contracting is a ritual, by which private parties knowingly enlist
the coercive power of the state. It stands to reason that changes in that
ritual—from wax seals to written signatures to shrink-wrapped boxes
to clicks on phones—will affect individual perceptions of what kinds
of agreements count as contracts and what consequences follow from
nonadherence to contract terms.62 However, as this section will
explore, there is actually very little empirical evidence on point.
Several contract scholars have hypothesized that consumers
might behave differently in response to online contracts.63 For
example, in her recent book Wrap Contracts,64 Nancy Kim contrasts
58 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, CB15-189, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales
3rd Quarter 2015 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/
15q3.pdf; Estimated Annual U.S. Retail Trade Sales - Total and E-commerce: 1998-2014,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/current/arts/
ecommerce.xls.
59 See MICHAEL BROWN ET AL., A.T. KEARNEY, ON SOLID GROUND: BRICK-ANDMORTAR IS THE FOUNDATION OF OMNICHANNEL RETAILING 4 (2014), https://www.
atkearney.com/documents/10192/4683364/On+Solid+Ground.pdf/f96d82ce-e40c-450d-97bb
-884b017f4cd7.
60 Ariana Tobin, 20 Years of Online Shopping Later. . ., MARKETPLACE, http://www.
marketplace.org/topics/tech/20-years-online-shopping-later (last visited Dec. 15, 2015);
Sucharita Mulpuru et al., US Ecommerce Forecast: 2013 to 2018, FORRESTER (May 12,
2014), https://www.forrester.com/report/US C̃ommerce+Forecast+2013+To+2018/-/ERES115513.
61 See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, MILLENNIALS & RETAIL: WILL THEY PUT DOWN
THEIR PHONES TO SHOP? 1 (2015), http://www.cushmanwakefield.com/~/media/reports/
corporate/Global%20Reports/RET_BB_Millennials_May2015_FINAL2.pdf.
62 See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 100
(2003) (stating that “contracts convey identifiable cultural messages”).
63 See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 19, at 492–93 (“While paper might impart a
certain seriousness to a transaction, consumers, it can be argued, are so accustomed to
instant gratification online that they pay little serious attention to the fact that they are
actually entering into binding arrangements.”); see also Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim
Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 23–25
(2009) (discussing inefficacy of disclosure remedies when considering online “recreational”
shoppers); Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 271–73 (2014) (discussing elements of electronic contracts that
make them different from offline forms).
64 KIM, supra note 3.
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“traditional” contracts—on paper, requiring a signature—with nontraditional “wrap contracts,” which are presented largely in “digital
form.”65 She argues first that digital contracts are “more ubiquitous
online than in the physical world,” making customers enter into deals
for “even trivial or minor transactions.”66 Thus, given length and ubiquity, consumers “may become habituated” to wrap contracts, a tendency exacerbated by the companies themselves.67 At the same time,
“[t]here is no clerk asking for a signature, no scribbling with a pen, no
duplicate copy to crumple in a pocket.”68 Kim notes that consumers
might simply behave differently online—the Internet is “suited to
impulsivity and impatience.”69 Or to put it differently, online contracts
lack the kinds of formalities which, Kim thinks, lead to
introspection.70
But the intuition (and that’s all it is) that contracting behavior
differs online does not tell us anything about whether contracting
online (often) changes contracting parties. There might be an interaction among age, experience, and views of contract that leads those
who have seen more digital contracts to think differently about contracting. Unfortunately, most of the work on the effect of age on views
of commerce rests on the assumption that millennials are distinctive
consumers per se.71 They are, as the cliché goes, digital natives.72
More particularly, they are cautious of commitment to long-term
agreements entered into through contracts that they find aversive.73
65

See id. at 55–57.
Id. at 59.
67 See id.; see also Rainer Böhme & Stefan Köpsell, Trained to Accept? A Field
Experiment on Consent Dialogs, PROC. 28TH ANN. CHI CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2403, 2403–05 (2010) (finding that consumers had been habituated to
accept terms that approximated the appearance of an end-user license agreement).
68 KIM, supra note 3, at 59.
69 Id. at 61.
70 See id. at 61–62; Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site
Disclosure of e-Standard Terms Backfire?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF
MARKET CONTRACTS 83, 85 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (arguing that consumers “may
not attach appropriate significance to a mouse click and therefore may fail to appreciate
the seriousness of their actions”).
71 See, e.g., Kari Mercer Dalton, Bridging the Digital Divide and Guiding the Millennial
Generation’s Research and Analysis, 18 BARRY L. REV. 167, 168 (2012) (“Millennials have
an aptitude for technology because it is a natural language for them.”).
72 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Generation C: Childhood, Code, and Creativity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1979, 1980 (2012); Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital
Immigrants Part 1, ON THE HORIZON, Sept.–Oct. 2001, at 1, http://www.emeraldinsight.
com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/10748120110424816.
73 See David Carnoy, Dish’s New Sling TV Internet TV Service Starts at $20, Features
ESPN, Disney Channel, CNN, TNT, and Other Channels, CNET (Jan. 5, 2015, 8:30 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/dish-launches-20-sling-tv-streaming-video-service-with-channellineup-that-includes-espn-disney/ (quoting the CEO of Sling TV LLC who described his
66
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There has been an explosion of research in recent years about the
attitudes of millennials on a variety of topics, ranging from shopping,74
to privacy,75 to trust in online commerce,76 to webpage design preferences,77 to brand loyalty.78 Absurd generalizations abound—
millennials79 are said to be the “least racist, least sexist, least
company’s new service as “designed . . . based on how millennials consume content, with
no contracts”); Tom Eggemeier, How to Revive the Lost Art of Consumer Loyalty for
Millennials, BUSINESS 2 COMMUNITY (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.business2community.com/
loyalty-marketing/how-to-revive-the-lost-art-of-customer-loyalty-for-millennials01341241#sThErHSBoiHH0uEc.97 (asserting that the variety of types of plans for mobile
phone service, including month-to-month and contract-free options, has resulted from the
rise of millennials who are “indecisive, unpredictable, and . . . reluctant to commit”).
74 See, e.g., Stephanie M. Noble et al., What Drives College-Age Generation Y
Consumers, 62 J. BUS. RES. 617 (2009); Anders Parment, Generation Y vs. Baby Boomers:
Shopping Behavior, Buyer Involvement and Implications for Retailing, 20 J. RETAILING &
CONSUMER SERV. 189 (2013); P. Sullivan & J. Heitmeyer, Looking at Gen Y Shopping
Preferences and Intentions: Exploring the Role of Experience and Apparel Involvement, 32
INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 285 (2008).
75 See, e.g., Michael Obal & Werner Kunz, Trust Development in E-services: A Cohort
Analysis of Millennials and Baby Boomers, 24 J. SERV. MGMT. 45, 55–56 (2013) (finding
that millenials were less concerned than baby boomers about website privacy cues).
76 See, e.g., id. at 54–57 (comparing the relative importance to millenials and baby
boomers of various influencers of trust on an e-retailer’s website); Anil Bilgihan, Gen Y
Customer Loyalty in Online Shopping: An Integrated Model of Trust, User Experience and
Branding, 61 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 103, 109–11 (2016) (concluding from a survey of
2500 Generation Y subjects that website features and flow were important in developing
trust toward an e-commerce website); see also Grant Blank & William H. Dutton, Age and
Trust in the Internet: The Centrality of Experience and Attitudes Toward Technology in
Britain, 30 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 135, 145 tbl.4, 148–49 (2012) (finding that experience
with the Internet and attitude toward technology, not age itself, influenced study
participants’ trust on the Internet and that “[a]s people gain experience with the Internet
they become more trusting”).
77 See Peter J. Danaher et al., Factors Affecting Web Site Visit Duration: A CrossDomain Analysis, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 182, 191 (2006) (finding that “[f]or younger
visitors, [website visit] duration increases with increasing functionality, whereas the reverse
is true for older [w]eb users”); Soussan Djamasbi et al., Generation Y, Web Design, and
Eye Tracking, 68 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 307, 317–20 (2010); Thompson S.H. Teo
& Vivien K.G. Lim, Usage and Perceptions of the Internet: What Has Age Got to Do with
It?, 1 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 371, 378 (1998) (finding that young and mature adults
tended to place more importance than youth did on whether a website’s design was easy to
read).
78 See Parment, supra note 74, at 196 (explaining that interviews and focus groups
reveal that “members of Generation Y have a very limited loyalty to retailers, unless they
provide superior customer value or any other advantage, such as price” and that
“Generation Yers are basing their choice of retailer either on the lowest price or on
convenience attributes”).
79 To encourage active readership, I challenge you to find and replace every mention of
the word “millennials” in this Article with “snake people.” See Sapna Maheshwari, This
Perfect Chrome Extension Replaces “Millennials” with “Snake People,” BUZZFEED (May
26, 2015, 11:44 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/sapna/replace-millennial-with-snakepeople.
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homophobic, least xenophobic, most inclusive, collaborative generation” ever.80
The real story is more nuanced. Simply put, variation within and
between “generations” is the rule, making it difficult to generalize
about such large and varied groups of Americans.81 It is impossible
with snapshot surveys to distinguish age82 from cohort effects.83 (Two
recent leading works in the field, Born Digital, by John Palfrey and
Urs Gasser,84 and It’s Complicated, by Danah Boyd,85 aptly capture
the complexity of studying generational differences.) That is, we just
cannot know yet if “millennials” as a group will look distinctive in
twenty or thirty years, or even if they are all that unique now.
In this Article, I am interested in the hypothesis that different
experiences with online contracting have led younger consumers to
see contracts—both online and offline—in distinctive ways. To the
extent that differences exist, it is possible that aging will moderate
them—just as it is possible that as older individuals’ experiences with
paper contracts become increasingly distant in time, their views of
contracting will start to look more like those of younger ones. Bracketing the question of whether what is observed is a cohort or an age
effect, what might we predict about age differences in contract? The
answer is that we just do not know much about this topic.
There is suggestive evidence on age and contracting behavior
from the fields of moral psychology and economics. In ultimatum
game studies, researchers have found that older adults are more likely
to have a preference for fair distributions than younger adults.86 That
80 Emily Kaiser, 5 Ways Millennials Will Change the American Workplace, MPR NEWS
(May 27, 2015), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/05/27/bcst-recent-graduates-workforce.
81 See Eszter Hargittai & Yuli Patrick Hsieh, Digital Inequality, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNET STUDIES 129, 135 (William H. Dutton ed., 2013) (pointing out
“considerable variation” in the computer skills among youth).
82 That is, millennials are different from their elders today, but they will change over
time.
83 That is, millennials are different as a cohort.
84 JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES (2008) (examining the ways that technological
omnipresence in various forms has influenced millenials).
85 BOYD, supra note 14, at 177–80 (arguing that the concept of “digital natives” was
intended to “provoke reaction” but that it “obscures the uneven distribution of
technological skills and media literacy across the youth population” and perpetuates
“digital inequality”).
86 See Werner Güth et al., Bargaining Outside the Lab - A Newspaper Experiment of a
Three-Person Ultimatum Game, 117 ECON. J. 449, 458–59 (2007) (finding that older
individuals and women cared more about equal distribution in an ultimatum game); David
R. Roalf et al., Risk, Reward, and Economic Decision Making in Aging, 67 JOURNALS
GERONTOLOGY SERIES B 289, 294–96 (2012) (finding differences between older and
younger adults in perceptions that offers were unfair).

1610

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1595

is, they are more likely to reject unfair offers (which they may see as
“socially disgusting”)87 while making fairer offers themselves. Though
some might attribute this difference to an increase in empathy across
life, recent studies do not support the intuition.88 The literature on
trust games—arguably closer to the contract example since they typically entail an agreement between subjects—does not suggest a clear
direction about the effects of age.89
There has been a flowering of recent research on the moral psychology of contract.90 However, almost none of that recent work pur87

Roalf et al., supra note 86, at 296.
Cf. Daniel Grühn et al., Empathy Across the Adult Lifespan: Longitudinal and
Experience-Sampling Findings, 8 EMOTION 753, 755, 762 (2008) (suggesting decreased
empathy among older adults resulted from differences among cohorts, not aging).
89 See Rick K. Wilson & Catherine C. Eckel, Trust and Social Exchange, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 243, 247 (James N.
Druckman et al. eds., 2011) (noting that trust generally is lowest in very young and very old
cohorts, while reciprocity is linearly related to age); Noel D. Johnson & Alexandra A.
Mislin, Trust Games: A Meta-Analysis, 32 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 865, 875 tbl.4, 876 (2011)
(finding that student subjects exhibited less reciprocity in trust games than nonstudents and
hypothesizing that age drove this difference, but discerning no statistically significant
difference between students and nonstudents in trust); cf. Matthias Sutter & Martin G.
Kocher, Trust and Trustworthiness Across Different Age Groups, 59 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 364, 378 (2007) (finding trust to be higher in all adult age groups).
90 See Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence
of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 88 (2012)
(finding that legalized approaches were less likely than moral framing to lead to
performance); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations
Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 31 (2011) (“The content of contracts, notwithstanding the
legal price of breach, induces compliance.”); David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 418–19 (2013) (finding
based on survey results that people are more likely to protect their interests against a
prospective contractual counterparty than an actual contractual counterparty and
proposing psychological explanations why); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological
Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1580–81 (2011) (finding that mortgage securitization reduces
homeowners’ feeling of obligation and increases the likelihood of breach); Tess WilkinsonRyan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108
MICH. L. REV. 633, 664–65 (2010) (concluding that “the presence of a liquidated-damages
clause in a contract reduces [moral] qualms and, in turn, encourages breach”); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of
Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 420–21 (2009) (finding that subjects exhibited
greater moral disapproval and awarded greater damages for efficient breaches as
compared with breaches to avoid a loss); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The
Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1296–98 (2015) (finding
that individuals see formation as related to concrete events like signature and the exchange
of money); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and
Legal Rules on Bargaining Behavior: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
315, 334–36 (2008) (finding that moral intuition drove subjects’ allocation of hypothetical
divorce settlements even in the face of contrary legal rules); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
Transferring Trust: Reciprocity Norms and Assignment of Contract, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
88
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posefully examines group-level differences in subjects’ views. In a
recent paper, for example, Zev Eigen found that younger subjects
were more likely to cheat on an online task despite having agreed not
to do so in a contract.91 Eigen and I later co-authored a paper on
individuals’ willingness to back out of a bargain where there were
real-money stakes. We unexpectedly found that older participants
were much more likely to keep their promises than younger ones—
those 55 to 64 breached at a 22% rate, those younger than 24 at a 54%
rate.92 However, only certain of these results were significant (given
the relatively few numbers of older subjects) and more work remains
to be done.
This appears to be the extent of experiments finding age effects in
attitudes toward contract formation, breach, or judgment.93 Given the
previous literature, the most that we can say is that there is some
reason to think that age matters to views of contract formation, especially when age is considered as a proxy for exposure to particular
kinds of contracts. But the exact valence, and magnitude, of the effect
is not obvious and is ripe for direct examination.
II
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

AND

RESULTS

A. The Sample
I undertook a series of experiments testing subjects’ responses to
hypothetical contract scenarios. After pretesting using subjects from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk),94 I enlisted a nationally represenSTUD. 511, 532 (2012) (finding that assigned contracts carry less moral obligation than
contracts between the original parties).
91 Zev J. Eigen, An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions
28–30 (Oct. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2338559.
92 Hoffman & Eigen, supra note 6, at 30. We also found evidence that another
individual difference—namely, gender—mattered to contracting behavior. This effect has
been observed in at least one other paper, but was particularly stark here: “[A]cross all
conditions, 51% of men backed out of their agreements; 31% of women did.” Id. at 44.
93 There are a number of papers that do not find age effects, though all have relatively
small samples and are not nationally representative. See, e.g., Bakos et al., supra note 3, at
30 tbl.5 (finding no age effects in visits to end-user license agreements); Stanislav
Mamonov & Raquel Benbunan-Fich, An Empirical Investigation of Privacy Breach
Perceptions Among Smartphone Application Users, 49 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 427,
432–33 (2015) (finding that the presence of legal permissions in terms of service reduced
smartphone users’ perceptions of privacy breach but finding no significant age effects in
sample of approximately 200 Turk subjects).
94 For more details regarding Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, see Requester, AMAZON
MECHANICAL TURK, https://requester.mturk.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2016). I pretested
using 898 master-qualified subjects in total on mTurk over two days in May and June 2015.
Master-qualified subjects are those who have been provided that designation as reliable by
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tative sample using SSI, a well-known recruitment firm.95 Use of SSI
permitted recruitment of a diverse sample by age, race, and gender, as
well as bypassed concerns about mTurk samples.96
I required participants to pass a preliminary attention check ques97
tion. Only subjects who passed the attention check were permitted
Amazon, though the precise nature of the qualification is obscure. As I explain infra at
note 134, there is evidence that master-qualified mTurk subjects are more careful and less
likely to answer questions at random, reducing noise and increasing statistical power. I
discuss results as appropriate in the notes below.
95 SSI is a professional survey company that was founded in 1977 and has offered
online samples for fifteen years. Participants were drawn from SSI’s panels and various
online communities, social networks, and websites of all types in the United States. See
Consumer Online Survey Research, SSI, https://www.surveysampling.com/solutions/datacollection/online-surveys/consumer/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016); see also Netta BarakCorren, Does Antidiscrimination Law Influence Religious Behavior? An Empirical
Examination, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 989 n.112 (2016) (using a nationally representative SSI
sample in academic research).
96 There is a growing literature on the suitability of mTurk samples. An important
synthesis can be found in KIM BARTEL SHEEHAN & MATTHEW PITTMAN, AMAZON’S
MECHANICAL TURK FOR ACADEMICS 13–33 (2016).
For recent work on mTurk representativeness, see Kevin E. Levay et al., The
Demographic and Political Composition of Mechanical Turk Samples, SAGE OPEN,
Jan.–Mar. 2016, at 2, 9–11, http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/6/1/2158244016636433.fulltext.pdf+html (concluding that while mTurk samples differ from population-based ones, a
workable approximation of a population-based sample can be obtained by weighting an
mTurk sample based on nine covariates); cf. Andrew R. Lewis et al., The (Non) Religion of
Mechanical Turk Workers, 54 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 419, 419–20 (2015)
(summarizing prior findings that mTurk respondents are “wealthier, younger, more
educated, less racially diverse, and more Democratic than national samples” and
additionally concluding that they are less religiously oriented).
For recent work positively comparing mTurk survey results to those from other
samples, see Christoph Bartneck et al., Comparing the Similarity of Responses Received
from Studies in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to Studies Conducted Online and with Direct
Recruitment, PLOS ONE, Apr. 14, 2015, at 17–18, 21 (finding statistically significant but
practically small differences between responses from mTurk and from online and campus
samples). But see Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine, Cross-Sample Comparisons and
External Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59, 77 (2014) (comparing results from
study using mTurk, YouGov, and undergraduate student samples and determining that of
the three, only the “[m]Turk sample produced results at odds with” the study’s theoretical
predictions). As compared to other online samples, mTurk subjects tend to pay attention to
survey prompts. See Adam J. Berinsky et al., Separating the Shirkers from the Workers?
Making Sure Respondents Pay Attention on Self-Administered Surveys, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI.
739, 745 & n.14 (2014) (remarking that mTurk subjects correctly answered screener
questions at rates higher than in other online samples).
An emergent issue with mTurk samples is that it appears that the total number of
mTurk survey respondents may be quite small (under 10,000 at any one time). See Neil
Stewart et al., The Average Laboratory Samples a Population of 7,300 Amazon Mechanical
Turk Workers, 10 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 479, 485–86 (2015) (using a “capturerecapture analysis” to determine “that, in any quarter year, the average laboratory can
reach about 7,300 workers”).
97 The attention check was recommended by SSI based on previous experience with the
population being recruited. The question stated:
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to consent to the survey.98 Before analysis, I eliminated 71 subjects
who completed the survey in less than 10% of the mean time (when
the average completion time was 15 minutes).
That left 1008 subjects.99 Each subject saw one of five rotating
experimental scenarios in a between-subjects design and then
answered a number of demographic and attitudinal questions.100 For
ease of exposition, I will describe those demographic prompts here
and provide descriptive statistics.
Gender: 532 (53%) female; 472 (47%) male; 4 did not identify.101
Race/Origin: 703 (70%) white; 138 (14%) African-American; 97
(10%) Hispanic; and a mix of other categories.102
Age: Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 90, and roughly
matched the 2012 U.S. Census distribution,103 as Figure 1 describes:

“This study seeks to understand how people process the questions that are being
asked to them. There are many aspects of a person’s behavior that are related to the way
they answer questions. One aspect is their ability to stay engaged throughout a survey and
a person’s willingness to read the directions fully.
Which of the following adjectives would you use to describe yourself?
To make sure you are currently paying attention, we would like you to answer ‘None
of the above’ to the question below.”
98 About 80% of those initially recruited by SSI passed the attention check.
99 The Institutional Review Board at Temple University reviewed and approved the
survey design before it was administered.
100 In an additional set of specifications (not reported here) I control for the order in
which the experiments were presented. Order effects are not significant on their own and
do not change the significance or non-significance of any of the results reported in the text.
101 By comparison, on Turk, 53% of subjects were men.
102 These approximate the national means. By comparison, on Turk, 80% of respondents
were white, 7% were black, and 6% were Latino.
103 See Population by Age and Sex: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2013), http://www.
census.gov/population/age/data/files/2012/2012gender_table1.xlsx. The mean sample age
was 45, with 21% over the age of 60 and 41% over 50. In my pretest Turk sample, 25% of
subjects reported being between 18 and 25, 50% under 30, and only 10% over the age of
50. The mean age was 34, and the maximum age was 72.
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Ideology: 38% of the sample identified as slightly to extremely
conservative; 36% as slightly to extremely liberal. These numbers
again roughly correspond to the population means—though like the
Turk sample, the SSI sample is more liberal than the population
mean.104
Education: 23% of the sample had no college education, 34% had
begun but not finished college, and an additional 27% were college
graduates. 10% of the sample reported having a master’s degree, and
4% reported having a professional degree.
Income: 24% of the sample reported household income below
$30,000 per year, 19% between $30,000 and $50,000, 35% up to
$100,000, and 16% were wealthy (a dummy variable I created for subjects with self-reported household income greater than $100,000 per
year).
Religiosity: I measured religiosity by asking for self-identification
into the following categories: not religious (25%), less religious
(22%), religious (35%), highly religious (12%), and extremely reli104 See Lydia Saad, U.S. Liberals at Record 24%, but Still Trail Conservatives, GALLUP
(Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180452/liberals-record-trail-conservatives.aspx
(reporting the results of a poll in which 38% of Americans identified as conservative and
24% as liberal). In my pretest Turk sample, 24% identified as slightly to extremely
conservative, but 60% identified as slightly to extremely liberal.
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gious (6%). I also asked respondents to identify the intensity of their
belief, asking, apart from special occasions, how often they attended
religious services ranging from never (30%), less often (24%), holy
days (10%), at least once a month (12%), once a week (17%), more
than once a week (6%), and every day (1%). These two items
together created a highly reliable scale, religscale.105
Contract Law Experience: I measured and thus controlled for
contract experience in a variety of ways. First, I asked subjects to rate
their “knowledge and experience with contract law”: 51% reported
none or some and about 24% extensive or a “fair amount” of knowledge. I created a dummy variable, inexperienced, which takes on a
value of 1 where subjects reported “[n]o” experience or knowledge of
contract law. Next I asked them how often they bought items online,
ranging from not at all to very frequently. Finally, I asked subjects
whether they had entered into a particular set of contracts in the last
year, including a mortgage (9%), a car lease (8%), a car purchase
(17%), an apartment lease (19%), a credit card agreement (35%), a
cellphone contract (32%), and a student loan (11%). I created a
contract scale, which added together the number of such contracts
subjects had entered into. These three contract experience questions
measure different attributes,106 and I therefore use them as independent controls.
B. Experimental Results, Part I: Millennials Are Internet-Friendly
Contract Formalists
The first set of studies explores how age influences subjects’ views
about assent. Contract law has long maintained an “objective” stance
on assent: So long as a reasonable person would consider herself
bound, it is irrelevant if in a particular contract the promisee actually
holds that belief. That stance remains the prevailing one on the
Internet, where it seems even less likely that parties understand themselves to be undertaking solemn commitments.
105 a = .81. Cronbach’s alpha (a) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of
attitudinal scales. By computing the degree of inter-correlation that exists among various
items within a scale, it can be used to assess whether the items can properly be treated as
common indicators of a latent attitude or trait—i.e., one that cannot be directly observed
and measured. See generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination
of Theory and Applications, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 98, 103 (1993). Generally, a > .70
suggests scale validity—i.e., that the measures when aggregated furnish a reliable measure
of the latent trait or attitude. See id. at 101–02 (recognizing that psychology literature has
generally regarded a > .70 as adequate but cautioning that it should be interpreted in light
of the number of items in and dimensions of the scale).
106 a = .42.
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I have recently explored, in work with a co-author, lay views
about formation. We found that overall, individuals tend to act like
contract formalists, at least some of the time.107 They think that contract formation occurs when the parties reduce their obligations to a
writing (as opposed to agree orally); they privilege the meaning of
signature and payment (though contract law might not); and they
appear fairly comfortable with permitting the enforceability of terms
that follow formalized assent.108 In a sense, the experiments that
follow all seek to understand how age interacts with these generalized
findings about the lay psychology of assent.
1. Experiment 1: The Case of Sally’s Phone
I started by asking subjects to respond to a scenario about
“Sally,” who had decided to buy a new phone. In this Experiment 1, I
divided subjects into two groups, based on how Sally was described to
have consummated the purchase—either in writing (online) or orally
(by phone). In the former, she visited a webpage that prompted her to
buy and contained a link to terms and conditions (which she did not
click to read). In the latter, she spoke to a salesman on the phone, who
prompted her to buy and told her there were other terms and conditions that she could hear if she wanted to (she didn’t). In both conditions Sally entered into a contract containing a ten-day return clause.
Unfortunately for Sally, the phone arrived while she was on vacation, with the box stating that the “terms inside will govern.” Worse,
when she returned from vacation, she found the phone to be a very
ugly color. She put the phone in the box and attempted to return it.
As all subjects read:
A few weeks later, [Sally] gets a letter in the mail from the firm. The
firm points out that there were terms governing refunds inside the
box which she could have [heard/learned] on the [phone/website].
Those terms stated that all returns must be made within 10 days,
unless the product is ‘defective,’ and that customers would be
charged for their first month of service automatically if the phone
was not returned in a timely way. The firm encloses a bill for $20.00
[the first month’s fee].

I asked four questions about this common consumer contracting
scenario: (1) When, if ever, was Sally bound to the “10 days or no
return” term? (2) Do you think that Sally and the phone company
have a legally binding contract? (3) Assuming Sally refuses to pay the
$20.00 fee, do you agree that she breached her contract with the
107 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, supra
note 90, at 1296–98.
108 See id. at 1281–94.
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phone company? (4) Regardless of whether you think that Sally was
legally bound to the phone company, do you think her conduct was
morally appropriate?
Figure 2 illustrates significant differences between the written and
oral versions of contract formation.109
FIGURE 2. WHEN WAS SALLY BOUND,
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION

BY
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The major finding here is that subjects in the written contract
condition were 50% more likely than those in the oral condition to
believe that Sally was bound to the no-return terms as soon as she had
agreed to them.110 Subjects in the oral contract condition were relatively more likely to believe that she was bound when the phone was
delivered.111 Their privilege of written agreements repeated in questions about whether subjects thought that there was a binding contract,112 and whether Sally breached by refusing to pay.113 There were
no significant differences in the perceived morality of Sally’s conduct
109 In an ANOVA analysis of the staged answer “When was Sally” and experimental
condition, the difference in conditional assignment was significant (F = 15.95, p < .0001).
110 For regression results, see Table 1 in the Appendix.
111 Interestingly, individuals who never or very rarely buy online think that contract
occurs at purchase about 18% of the time; those who buy online often think it happens
about 31% of the time.
112 In a comparison-of-means test, the oral contract mean of 4.73 compares to the
written contract mean of 5.15. This difference is significant (Welch test df 977.4, t = -3.96,
p < .001).
113 In a comparison-of-means test, the oral contract mean of 4.05 compares to the
written contract mean of 4.28. This difference is significant (Welch test df 1000.24, t = -2.67,
p < .01).

1618

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1595

(in returning the phone despite the contract terms). These results are
broadly consistent with my previous work.114
We might analyze the relationship between age and views on contracting in a number of ways. A common approach would be to run a
regression, where the dependent variable is the reported attitude
toward contract and age and other demographic factors are independent variables. For all of the experiments in this paper, I’ve included
such a regression table in the Appendix.115
But I don’t think that such a regression provides the clearest test
of the questions that this paper is exploring. I’m not interested in a
pure age effect, but rather the combination of age and the characteristics that travel with it. Younger subjects are: (1) more likely to have
experience with buying over the Internet;116 (2) more likely to be liberal;117 (3) less likely to be religious;118 and (4) less likely to be rich.119
Given this cluster of characteristics, parceling out the individualized
effect of being a younger subject is likely to be somewhat misleading.
Thus, for the remainder of this paper, I will generally report raw mean
differences for age, noting when appropriate that such differences are
significant or insignificant by reference to the Appendix tables. Typically (and unsurprisingly) any result I relay in a Figure was significant
using traditional tests of significance, and controlling for possibly confounding variables.120
This permits me to use the actual data, and not a statistical simulation, to illustrate how age and all the demographic characteristics it
signifies interact with views on contracting. Let’s start by examining
114 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, supra
note 90, at 1296–98 (showing “that individuals privilege particular behavioral moments—
signature, payment, and possession—above the verbal communication of assent”).
115 For this experiment, see Appendix, Tables 1 through 3.
116 Though experience with contract law was uncorrelated with millennial status,
millennial status was highly correlated with buying items online (Likert scale 3.33 v. 3.82,
Welch test df 793.5, t = -7.96, p < .0001) and the total contract scale (total contracts 1.04 v.
1.79, Welch test df 602.5, t = -7.73, p < .001).
117 In my data, 27% of millennials but 36% of nonmillennials reported being
conservative or extremely conservative. The difference is significant (t = 2.89, p < .01).
118 The religious scale measure was significantly different for millennials and
nonmillenials (t = 2.59, p < .01).
119 11% of millennials reported being wealthy under my coding, compared to 19% of
nonmillenials. The difference is significant (t = 3.15, p < .01).
120 Some exceptions: The individual category differences in Figure 6 are not all
significant, though age alone is. There are also several instances where “age” is not
significant but the more gross category “millennial” is, as the tables display. This is in part
due to nonlinearity in the age variable. In alternative specifications (unreported but
available) I used squared terms to demonstrate the effect.
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the question of whether the contract is binding.121 As a main effect,
only 6% of those who saw a written contract denied that it was
binding, while 14% of those in the oral contract condition held that
view. Effects for age depended on whether the subjects saw the
written or oral agreements, as the next Figure illustrates. Here, for the
purposes of expositional clarity, I have divided the data roughly in
two, distinguishing those 35 and younger (millennials) from the rest.

Agreed Not Binding

FIGURE 3. IS

THE

CONTRACT BINDING?
16%
12%

7%
3%
Written (Internet)
Millennials

Oral (Phone)
Older Subjects

Note: Raw means for likelihood to strongly or very strongly agree that Sally’s contract was
not binding, contingent on being 35 and under (millennial) or older. These differences are
significant when controlling for other demographic traits. See Appendix, Table 2 for
details.

That is, younger subjects are more affected by the context—they
see more of a difference in the enforceability of oral and written contracts—than the rest of us. This is our first evidence in support of a
common-sense implication of the relationship between age, experience, and views of contracting: Because more of their experience with
contracting is over the web, younger consumers are more likely to discount the legitimacy of other forms of formation.122
121 Subjects clicking 1 or 2 (i.e., definitely not), out of 7, on the question: “Do you think
that Sally and the phone company have a legally binding contract?”
122 I found fewer individual differences impacted subjects’ evaluation of whether Sally
breached her contract by refusing to pay the $20 fee. See app., tbl. 3. The difference
between the conditions was significant, as those in the written contract condition were
more likely to agree that she breached than in the oral agreement. There were age effects,
but they appear to be more or less confined to older Americans (75+). Subjects under that
age all generally agreed that Sally was the more likely to be the breaching party in the
written condition; those above it had precisely the opposite intuition, being more likely to
conclude that she was in breach of the telephone contract than the Internet contract. Or to
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But the precise nature of this relationship is difficult to ascertain.
We cannot easily measure the key mechanism of interest, which is how
much more of younger subjects’ total contracting experience is online
(compared to older ones). It’s that “dosage” of Internet experience
that I hypothesize produces different views of contract. Self-reported
online contracting experience is a proxy, but an imperfect one, for this
dosage question. Thus, simply observing age differences, even when
those age differences are correlated with differences in online use,
can’t tell us that online experience is causing differences in perceptions of contract. Nonetheless, online contracting does appear to have
an effect, even holding age constant. Figure 4 illustrates this difference
by zooming in just on the younger subjects in the sample, and again
asking whether the oral or written contract was enforceable.
FIGURE 4: IS

THE

CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE?

Likelihood
Unenforceable

21%
17%
10%

14%

12%

2%

2%
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Very
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Note: A post-regression estimation (using Stata’s margins command)123 of the likelihood
of finding the contract unenforceable, by oral or written condition, and by self-reported
contract experience, among millennials.

As Figure 4 illustrates, the real effect of online experience is not
that it increases trust in online contracting: Millennials are already at a
ceiling on that measure.124 Rather, online contracting erodes the legitput it differently, the oldest members of my sample simply are not as likely to think that
breach of an Internet contract is (as) wrongful as are those under 75.
123 For a description of margins, see Richard Williams, Using the Margins Command to
Estimate and Interpret Adjusted Predictions and Marginal Effects, 12 STATA J. 308 (2012).
124 In the rest of the sample, views of unenforceability in the digital condition went from
4% (in the least likely online buyers) to 10%.
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imacy of oral contracts. This is a piece of evidence consistent with the
causal hypothesis.
2. Experiment 2: Contract Versus Privacy, on Paper and on a Pad
Experiment 1 varied both the written nature of the acceptance
and whether it occurred using digital technology. The next experiment
attempts to drill down further and simply vary—within the same scenario—how formation occurs when both options are in writing, either
on paper or using a digital pad. In this scenario, all subjects read the
following text:
Kevin takes a few medications regularly, and every month for years
he has refilled his prescription at the local pharmacy, SafeRX.
In February when Kevin picks up his refills he tells the pharmacist
that he is going to be away next month visiting family members, and
won’t be able to pick up his medications in person. The pharmacist
tells Kevin that he can have March’s medication delivered by mail if
he agrees to the pharmacy’s contract governing mail order
medication.

The subjects were then split, seeing one or the other of the following text and graphic:
The pharmacist asks Kevin to
complete and sign the paper
contract while he is at the
checkout counter.

The pharmacist asks Kevin to
complete and sign the contract
on a tablet computer while he is
at the checkout counter.

Finally, all subjects read the following:
Kevin fills out the contract form, which asks for his credit card
information, delivery address, and names of medications to be delivered by mail. The form also includes various terms and conditions,
and a checkbox with the text ‘Please check here if you do NOT
want your information shared with third party marketing companies.’ [B]ut Kevin does not notice the box or check it.
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In March while Kevin is visiting his family his medication arrives
perfectly on time. However, there was also a pile of junk mail
waiting for him, and more that arrives while he is visiting. His family
is mostly amused, but Kevin is embarrassed and annoyed at SafeRX
for giving away the address to marketing companies.

Subjects were then told that federal law prohibits this kind of
sharing of personally identifiable health information absent contractual assent and were asked (1) if Kevin had agreed “in the SafeRX
contract” to permit information sharing; and (2) if it was “fair” for
SafeRX to share information.
Before diving into the results, I will concede to having put a
thumb on the scale: This context (privacy) is one where the conventional account suggests age effects are particularly likely. Older consumers, more than younger ones, “look for cues of privacy before they
will begin transacting with an online e-service.”125 Of course, such
views are influenced by digital experience.126 Moreover, the context of
such notices might be affected by age, as younger consumers appear
to focus on images while older ones allocate relatively more attention
to text.127
I found no general effect of condition assignment on subjects’
views of whether Kevin had entered into an agreement to disclose his
personally identifiable information.128 Unexpectedly, I found that mil125 Obal & Kunz, supra note 75, at 57. But see Chris Hoofnagle et al., How Different
Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes &
Policies? 3–4 (April 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864 (finding few differences in attitudes toward information
privacy based on age).
126 See Jim Chen et al., An Exploratory Investigation of the Relationships Between
Consumer Characteristics and Information Privacy, 11 MKTG. MGMT. J. 73, 76–80 (2001)
(reporting that among experienced online shoppers there was “no significant correlation
between age and privacy concerns about [i]nternal [s]econdary [u]se of personal data,
[e]xternal [s]econdary [u]se of personal data, and misuse of credit card number”); see also
Hee “Andy” Lee et al., Presentation Formats of Policy Statements on Hotel Websites and
Privacy Concerns: A Multimedia Learning Theory Perspective, 37 J. HOSPITALITY &
TOURISM RES. 470, 479 (2013) (finding that “[t]he more experienced people were in
making online hotel bookings, the less concerned they were about online privacy”).
127 See Soussan Djamasbi et al., Online Viewing and Aesthetic Preferences of Generation
Y and the Baby Boomer Generation: Testing User Web Site Experience Through Eye
Tracking, 15 INT’L J. ELECTRONIC COM. 121, 142–43, 148–49 (2011) (finding baby boomers
paid greater attention to webpage text than did Generation Y, even though both
generations expressed equal preferences for images over text). See generally Matthew W.
Vail et al., An Empirical Study of Consumer Perceptions and Comprehension of Web Site
Privacy Policies, 55 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 442 (2008) (comparing
various ways to present privacy policies and their effects on consumer understanding and
trust).
128 t = -0.47; p = .64.
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lennials were slightly less likely to agree129 that Kevin had agreed in
the contract to permit the firm to share his personal information.130
I did find a significant main effect of the digital signature for subjects’ perception of the fairness of the exchange; subjects were more
likely to think the firm’s behavior fair when Kevin signed on paper.131
As Figure 5 illustrates, younger subjects’ views about the fairness of
privacy loss didn’t turn on the contract. By contrast, older subjects’
views were conditional on how the contract was formed. Generally as
subjects aged they were more likely to think that the paper signature
carried more legitimizing weight than the digital signature.
FIGURE 5. UNFAIR

TO

SHARE KEVIN’S DATA?

Sharing Was Unfair

55%

49%

49%

48%

Paper Signature
Millennials

Digital Signature
Older Subjects

Note: Percent of subjects who very strongly, strongly, or somewhat thought that sharing
Kevin’s data was unfair in light of the contract. These individual differences are significant
by condition, controlling for other demographic factors, as Table 4 in the Appendix
displays.

In sum, as some have suspected, millennials do seem to have a
different understanding of contractual assent than do older subjects.
They are more likely to think contracts are written documents, and
when those written documents happen digitally, they are more likely
to think that they fairly can surrender public rights. In short, while
129 That is, they were more likely to “[p]robably” or “[d]efinitely” (5 or 6 on a six-item
scale) agree.
130 In my data, 37% of millennials and 42% of older subjects strongly felt that there was
an agreement. The difference is not significant using a two-tailed test (p = .12).
131 The mean response for the paper treatment was 3.71; the mean response for the
digital treatment was 3.56. These differed, but with a t-statistic of 1.2, the difference was
only marginally significant (p = .11).
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individuals generally are contract formalists, millennials are formalists
on steroids.
C. Experimental Results, Part II: Millennials Think Contract Law
Is Unforgiving
Younger consumers’ views of contracts as more formalized might
also extend to their views of the content of contract law. That is, if
contracting is simply a formal game, it stands to reason that those
who’ve breached are losers, to whom the law provides no excuse.
To test that hypothesis, I provided subjects with a variant of the
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. case discussed above.132
Just as in that case, subjects were told that Williams, a mother, had
bought a variety of household items subject to a cross-collateralization
clause—which I provided in full.133 Around one in three respondents
appeared to clearly understand the clause’s import, and I used that
understanding as a regression control.134
132

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
“[T]he amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser] to
the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the
amount of each installment payment to be made by [purchaser] under such prior leases,
bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be
credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by
[purchaser] at the time each such payment is made.” Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted).
134 I tested subjects’ understanding of the clause by providing an example:
[I]magine that Williams bought a kitchen table which she has been making regular
payments on. She still owes $50 on the table when she buys pots and pans, also for $50.
She now owes the store a total of $100.
The next month she makes a $50 payment, and then she stops making any payments.
Based on the clause above, what does Williams currently owe the store? (Assume
there is no interest.)
45% of subjects correctly answered that “nothing is completely paid off,” 28% thought the
table was paid off, 9% though the pots and pans were paid off, while 14% forthrightly
admitted having no idea what the right answer was. That lack of knowledge played out
when understanding the store’s options. Subjects were told that “[t]he store wants to take
further action. Which items can they repossess?” Only 41% correctly answered that the
store could repossess all of the items. Overall, 31% of the subjects correctly understood the
meaning of the clause and understood what the store could do in response. Neither race,
gender, ideology, religiosity, nor education predicted the propensity to be a contract
“genius.” Subjects who self-reported having more “knowledge and experience with
contract law in the United States” were significantly more likely to correctly answer both
questions. Using the post-estimation margins command in Stata, I estimate that while 22%
of those who reported having no contract knowledge got both questions right, 34% of
those who reported having some or extensive contract knowledge got both questions right.
Since the regression controls for experience and time spent on the survey, we can fairly say
that the self-reported contract experience variable reflects something latent about
knowledge of and ability to read contract terms. In pretesting on Turk, 43% of subjects
scored both items correctly, another piece of evidence supporting previous research that
certain high-reputation Turk subjects, such as those that comprised my sample, are
unusually careful when answering survey questions. See Eyal Peer et al., Reputation as a
133
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I next asked subjects to respond to the legal and moral appropriateness of the store’s attempt to repossess a variety of household
items, matching the sundries from the case,135 after Williams bought a
“$500 television” and failed to pay the overall debt due.136 On a sixitem Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very inappropriate) to 6 (very
appropriate), the mean for “legally appropriate” was 3.22 and that for
“morally appropriate” was 2.7, meaning that subjects viewed the
store’s behavior as legally more permissible than it was moral.
In Figure 6, I display the raw means for the relationship between
age and responses to the questions of the contract’s legal and moral
appropriateness, before the subjects learned about the law of
unconscionability.
FIGURE 6. NAÏVE VIEWS OF CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION
CONTRACT
Mean Appropriateness
Rating
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Note: Mean raw Likert responses (on 1–6 scale, where 6 is very appropriate) to questions
about the moral and legal appropriateness of the Walker-Thomas contract. Age differences
are significant standing alone. See Appendix, Table 5 for details.
Sufficient Condition for Data Quality on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 46 BEHAV. RES. 1023,
1028–31 (2014) (finding that a subset of high-reputation Turk workers rarely failed
attention checks and provided high-quality data).
135 That list’s contents, reprinted from the survey, are illustrative: 1 wallet, 2 pairs of
draperies, 1 apron set, 1 pot holder set, 1 set of rugs, 1 pair of draperies, 1 2x6 folding bed,
1 chest, 1 9x12 linoleum rug, 2 pairs of curtains, 4 sheets, 1 portable fan, 2 pairs of curtains,
1 typewriter, 2 toy guns, 1 metal bed, 1 inner spring mattress, 4 kitchen chairs, 1 bath mat
set, shower curtains, 1 washing machine. See also Pierre E. Dostert, Appellate Restatement
of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work, 54 A.B.A. J. 1183, 1183 n.1, 1184 n.2 (1968)
(listing the items whose seizure the writ authorized and the items actually seized).
136 A $500 television sounds more realistic in 2015 than the case’s actual $500 stereo
system.
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Interpreting the figure is fairly straightforward: Younger subjects
were significantly more likely to think the contract was legally and
morally appropriate than older subjects.
In the next part of the experiment, subjects were asked to evaluate whether the facts of the case met the legal definition of the
unconscionability defense. I told subjects that contracts are “unenforceable when they [are] entered without meaningful choice and the
contract terms are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”137 I
highlighted Williams’s poverty (she had been “on government assistance in the past”), the absence of other furniture stores in the town,
and the fact that the “furniture store is quite profitable.” I then asked
if she should be bound to the contract notwithstanding her defense.
The mean respondent answer was 4.9, where 1 was “[d]efinitely
[n]ot” and 7 was “[d]efinitely [y]es.” Or to put it differently, once they
had learned about the law, subjects grew less sympathetic to
Williams’s position than they were when they knew nothing of the law
except their naı̈ve understandings. Figure 7 illustrates how age interacts with these results.
FIGURE 7. IS

THE

CONTRACT LAWFUL?

Contract Enforceable

49%
42%

42%

36-45

46-55

47%
43%

34%
24%

18-25

26-35

56-65

66-75

76+

Age
Note: Percent of subjects who very strongly or strongly agreed that the Walker-Thomas
contract was enforceable after learning of the defense of unconscionability. Age increases
are significantly and positively associated with finding the contract legally binding. See
Appendix, Table 5 for details.

137 See Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 449 (setting out unconscionability standard); see
also U.C.C. § 2-306 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (providing the court may
refuse to enforce a contract it finds unconscionable).
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Figure 7 shows the complexity of the relationship between age
and views of enforceability. Younger subjects were less likely than
older subjects to think that the store was wrong when they did not
know the law; after they had been informed of the law the relationship
reversed. Generally, older subjects were more likely to think that the
law of unconscionability was not satisfied on the facts provided—they
were more likely to conclude that Williams retained sufficient
freedom to make choices for herself.
These experimental results, when combined with the ones that
preceded them, suggest that millennials indeed naively believe that
contract law does not account for fairness or moral norms, but is
instead a bit of a game. Those players who end up before a tribunal
are to be judged for failing to win. Thus, when I told subjects something about the content of contract doctrine—that it permits the
unconscionability defense when bargains are unfair—millennials’
views were updated. They were free to feel more sympathetic to contracting parties who made bad choices.
D. Experimental Results, Part III: Millennials Aren’t
Averse to Contracts
The prior experiments provide evidence that age mediates perceptions of contract formation in ways that will have a payoff in realworld contracts. To make these findings concrete, I undertook to test
how individuals reacted to a so-called “no contract” clause. “No contract” clauses are now common in advertising from cellphone companies and other consumer goods; they explicitly disclaim contracts
(while, in fact, binding users to terms but freeing them from termination fees). Two theories seek to explain the rise of these contracts.
One is wrong and one is incomplete.
The popular explanation for no-contract clauses is that they
appeal to millennials “who don’t appreciate being tied down” to a
contract.138 To the extent that this position is sourced, the foundation
appears to be marketing research in which millennials self-report
being averse to certain kinds of long-term contracts.139 It is difficult,
however, to judge how much of millennials’ supposed fear of commitment is a distinctive generational view, and how much is based on
138 See Kendal Perez, How Millennials Can Save Money on Mobile, CHELSEA (March
28, 2014), http://chelseakrost.com/how-millennials-can-save-money-on-mobile/.
139 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Fear of Commitment, Economy Drive Generation Y
Shopping Patterns, USNEWS (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/04/24/fear-of-commitment-economy-drive-generation-y-shopping-patterns
(discussing the business implications of a market research report that described millenials
as “commitment-phobic”).
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millennials’ relatively lower wealth than their elders, which (obviously) tends to dampen interest in large financial commitments.
A competing hypothesis, which I find incomplete support for in
my results, comes in the form of a new paper by Bar-Gill and BenShahar.140 They defend “no contract” contracts as “effectively and
nondeceptively” signaling “that consumers are not going to be stuck
prospectively with a contract they do not like.”141 This bonding mechanism permits firms to use contract to signal high quality goods.142
Thus, they predict that often more experienced consumers will rationally choose no-contract clauses, and pay a small premium, while less
experienced consumers will choose short term discounts and pay
higher liquidated fees later.143
To test these hypotheses, I created a scenario which tried, as
much as possible, to make the difference between a “no contract”
clause and a clause with no actual obligation to be irrelevant. Thus,
subjects saw one of two alternate scenarios, each accompanying a picture to make the text more salient.

“No contract”

“Cancel at any time”

Imagine that you are thinking about
joining a gym which is conveniently
located to [sic] your house. They
have two pricing options. The first is
$600 per year, which you can either
pay fully upfront, or make 12 payments of $50 per month. The second
is a “NO CONTRACT” option
requiring an increased rate of $60
per month, but you can cancel at
any time. In both options, you’ll
have to sign the typical terms and

Imagine that you are thinking about
joining a gym which is conveniently
located to [sic] your house. They
have two pricing options. The first is
$600 per year, which you can either
pay fully upfront, or make 12 payments of $50 per month. The second
is an option requiring an increased
rate of $60 per month, but you can
cancel at any time. In both options,
you’ll have to sign the typical terms
and conditions (which will include,

140 Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151
(2014).
141 Id. at 159.
142 Id. at 170–71.
143 See id. at 178–79, 181.
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conditions (which will include, for
example, a release from the gym’s
liability if you use the equipment
incorrectly).

for example, a release from the
gym’s liability if you use the equipment incorrectly).

Which deal would you prefer?

Which deal would you prefer?

Thus, in both scenarios, subjects should have understood that
they were choosing between an annual contract and a more expensive
monthly contract. The monthly contracts differed only in how they
were labeled—highlighting that it was a “‘NO CONTRACT’ option,”
or a plain “option” permitting cancellation at any time. The variable
of interest was asking subjects to choose between the annual contract
(at an annualized rate of $50/month) or the cancellable monthly contract at $60/month.
I was interested in whether subjects would be more likely to take
the expensive monthly rate when it was presented in the “no contract”
rather than the “cancel at any time” frame. Averaging across both
conditions, most (66%) subjects opted for the month-to-month deal
(forgoing $10 of savings). But subjects’ choice was influenced by the
presence or absence of the “no contract” term. While in the “cancel at
any time” condition, 62% of subjects took the annual deal, in the “no
contract” condition, 70% did.144 The finding alone suggests some
reason to question whether Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar have entirely
accounted for the cognitive costs of no contract clauses.
The individual variance around this effect is equally interesting.
Recall that Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar argued experienced subjects
would be more likely to choose no contract clauses: I found (at best)
mixed support for that hypothesis.145 The effect of age was (again)
144

The difference is significant (t = -2.47, p = .014).
In the “cancel at any time” condition, the only experience factor predicting
likelihood to choose the monthly contract was the total contract scale, wherein subjects
who reported entering under three of the particular contract types in the last year were
likely to choose the monthly deal about 65% of the time, while those who were regular
contracting parties chose the monthly about 55% of the time. That is, experience with
contracting made people more comfortable with the annual contract, not less. In the “no
contract” condition, however, when controlling for other factors, neither self-reported
contracting experience nor time online predicted the decision to take the monthly deal. In
145
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conditional on the experimental context. Figure 8 illustrates the interaction between age, likelihood of taking the more expensive monthly
deal, and how that deal was presented.

Monthly Contract Preferred

FIGURE 8. DO YOU PREFER THE MONTHLY
OR ANNUAL CONTRACT?
74%

64%
62%

61%

“No Contract”
Millennials

“Cancel at any time”
Older Subjects

Note: Percent of subjects who preferred the monthly to the annual contract, contingent on
being assigned to the “no contract” or the “cancel at any time” condition. All values are
raw means. Individual differences are significant. See Appendix, Table 6 for details.

The Figure shows that younger subjects are essentially indifferent
to being told either that the contract was a “no contract” or a “cancel
at any time” variant. But older subjects were lured in by no-contract
clauses. They are about 21% more likely (74% versus 61%) to choose
the monthly contract when it is characterized as a “no contract” deal
than when it is characterized as a “cancel at any time” deal. The result
holds even when controlling for self-reported experience with contracting and knowledge of contract law.
Those in the heart of the middle-aged population are especially
vulnerable—66% of subjects aged 45–54 would choose the monthly
deal in the “cancel at any time” condition, while 86% would take it
when a “no contract” agreement dangled before them. That is a 30%
regard to self-reported experience with contract law, subjects who self-reported being very
inexperienced took the monthly deal around 70% of the time; subjects who were more
experienced took the monthly deal 62% of the time. Neither result is clearly consistent
with the Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar model. I found no interaction effects between
experience and the conditional framing. One might argue, though, that because younger
subjects were more likely to enter into online contracts and more likely to enter into more
contracts, the age effects I discuss in the text could be attributed in part to experience.

December 2016]

FROM PROMISE TO FORM

1631

increase in choosing a more expensive option resulting from a legally
irrelevant difference in wording.
I also asked individuals the most they would be willing to pay for
the monthly contract. Here, I do not find differences between conditions (not entirely surprising given the noise around willingness to pay
measures).146 They simply did not care that such monthly contracts
were advertised as “no contract” obligations.
In the previous experiments, I suggested that younger individuals
held a more formal, less moralized, view of contracting than older
ones. With those findings in mind, we might explain the results of this
Experiment as follows: Younger individuals simply don’t care if something is called a contract, since contracting itself is just the formal rules
of a game. But for older individuals, a “contract” codes as “moral
commitment” and “inability to exit.” Thus, “no contract” promises
freedom from guilt and regret, and is correspondingly more enticing.
III
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

AND

CONTRACT LAW

What do these results mean for contract doctrine and theory?
This section begins the task of laying out how contract law informed
by individual differences about contract schema ought to look.
A. Contract Schema and a Thought Experiment
“A schema is a mental model for a concept, one that often draws
on a prototype.”147 Thus, for example, the concept of a trial is a
schema resulting from experience, whether actual or in popular culture. That trial schema gives meaning to features like the judge in her
robe, the jurors in their box, the rhythms of direct and cross-examination. Schemas permit individuals to easily categorize new information—simplifying decisions on how to behave and react to social
problems.148
146 I did find that younger subjects were generally willing to pay more for monthly
contracts than older subjects ($66 per month versus $60 per month). The difference is
significant (t = -2.07, p < 0.05). However, this effect is highly sensitive to a small number of
outliers (around ten young individuals who self-reported high willingness to pay high
amounts).
147 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, supra note
90, at 1290 n.77; see also Robert Axelrod, Schema Theory: An Information Processing
Model of Perception and Cognition, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1248, 1248 (1973) (describing
schema: “When new information becomes available, a person tries to fit the new
information into the pattern which he has used in the past to interpret information about
the same situation”).
148 In the “psychological contract” literature, researchers have used this concept to
describe how individuals come to hold a package of views about what legal duties the
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In previous work, I have found that a “prototypical contract
implicates the vernacular of ‘doing the paperwork,’ ‘getting it in
writing,’ and ‘signing on the dotted line.’”149 Here, I have suggested
that our contract schema is sensitive to formative experiences with
consumer contracts, and (relatedly) to a consumer’s age. Experience
with particular kinds of agreements drives views about contract as
individuals develop typical, patterned understandings of the practical
import of consumer contracting. Repeated experiences educate subjects into what happens when contracts are signed (and breached), the
limits of shopping in the face of contract terms, the meaning of “no
contract” clauses, and the like.
The foregoing experiments suggested that, all else equal, younger
consumers, who are significantly more engaged with online contracting than older consumers, have a distinctive set of contract
schemas. They:
1. Are more likely to breach contracts;150
2. Are less likely to see oral contracts as binding;
3. Are more likely to see contracts formed online as binding and
legitimizing;
4. Are (naively) less attentive to the fairness of bargains than
older subjects, but, when informed of the law, more likely to
excuse obligation;
5. Are less fearful of being bound to “contracts” than older consumers, who are especially disposed to find “no contract”
clauses attractive.
In a sense, younger subjects seem to operate somewhat like
Holmes’s “bad man”:151 They may not be against “contract” as an
institution (indeed, they naively think that contract is a set of binding
rules that operates without context, at least for others). But they are
against treating contracts as promises that bind them and more likely
to view them as simply forms.152 When others are caught in the net
employment relationship entails. See, e.g., Ultan P. Sherman & Michael J. Morley, On the
Formation of the Psychological Contract: A Schema Theory Perspective, 40 GROUP & ORG.
MGMT. 160, 160, 164 (2015).
149 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, supra note
90, at 1297.
150 See Hoffman & Eigen, supra note 6, at 29–32 (finding younger subjects were more
likely to breach).
151 Holmes said, famously, “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.” Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461–62 (1897).
152 Hence, the Article’s title, which is a play off of Sir Henry Sumner Maine: “[T]he
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Beacon Press 1963) (1861).
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that such forms cast, younger subjects are loathe to excuse obligation,
seemingly not because law is moral but simply because it is law. But
when put to the question—do forms constrain me?—younger subjects
are more likely to balk and deny contract’s force.
It is not obvious that younger consumers’ views about contract
will remain consistent over their lives.153 But imagine for a moment
that they will, and that the views I have described here become dominant across the population. In that thought experiment, what will
become of contract law?
Imagining contract doctrine operating on a landscape where its
subjects think contracts are forms exposes just how deeply contract
theory needs citizens to view contracts as moral promises. In classical
and economic contract theory, legal rules provide the primary behavioral spur—toward or against precaution, formation, and contract.154
For example, our damage-centered remedial regime undercompensates breach, and economists have long suggested that it consequently
motivates it.155 But relational theorists, and more recently behavioralists, have taught us differently: Both moral and reputational norms
constrain opportunistic behavior.156 Thus, we can undercompensate
breach, only loosely guard against exploitation, weakly hold parties
together, and not give parties the remedies they seek,157 because parties have moral intuitions about contract, and consequent reputational
concerns, that constrain breach and make it abnormal.
In the long-run, a world of Holmesian consumers would require a
very different set of contract rules. To constrain breach in the ordinary
course, we might seek to re-moralize contracting by finding a new set
of formalities, better attuned to modern circumstances.158 Or perhaps
doctrine would revisit the question of specific performance, making it
more available in ordinary contracts, including contracts for services,
153

See supra text accompanying notes 81–85.
For a useful summary of the literature on optimal precautions, see Richard Craswell,
The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
151, 163–65 (2005).
155 On efficient breach generally, see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (questioning the tenability of efficient breach theory as both a
normative and descriptive matter).
156 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 12, at 420–23 (discussing the role of moral
norms); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 62–65 (1963) (discussing how reputational constraints motivate
businesspeople to resolve some disputes without contracts).
157 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1003, 1043–44 (2010) (explaining the preference for specific performance as a
function of dignitary harm).
158 See Hoffman & Eigen, supra note 6, at 38–39 (arguing for new forms of
consideration formality).
154
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so as to avoid normalizing breach.159 These concerns are not limited to
consumer contracting: In the absence of widely shared moral sanctions for breach, would firms really see reputational concerns as a
motive to keep their promises?160
Though this is just a thought experiment, it shows that we ought
to take seriously the long-term effects that contracting practices might
have on contracting doctrine. It is therefore odd to find that historically, when courts discuss the role of identity in contract, it’s typically
pushed to the margin and to the defense.161 These results on the malleability of contractual schema then suggest the need for more
research on individual differences in contract law.
But what follows more directly in terms of current practice? That
is, whatever weakening at the foundations contracts’ demoralification
implies, what are the implications of these data for today’s practice?
B. Firm Behavior and Doctrinal Responses
There is now a large and robust literature on how cognitive
errors, shared by all contracting parties, illuminate the failings of contract doctrine and should cause us to reconsider changing the content
of contract cases. Russell Korobkin’s early paper on status quo bias
and Melvin Eisenberg’s article on liquidated damages clauses are
159 Breach is contagious. See Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract, supra
note 90, at 1575–78 (discussing how shifting social norms may facilitate stategic mortgage
breaches); Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on
Mortgages 17 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 15145, 2009), http://www.nber
.org/papers/w15145 (finding that the likelihood of default increases with an increase in the
foreclosure rate in the surrounding zip code).
160 A separate research question is whether younger subjects are more generally
inclined to view legal rules as prices for bad conduct rather than as moral prohibitions. Cf.
Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8–15 (2000)
(finding that the number of parents late in picking up their children from an Israeli daycare
increased after the introduction of a fine).
161 See Debora L. Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on
Gender and Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 762–67 (2010) (critiquing how courts
portrayed female contracting parties as lacking agency); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,
420 n.54 (1987) (“[M]ost successful defenses feature women, particularly if they are old and
widowed; illiterates; blacks and other minorities; the abjectly poor; and the old and
infirm.”); Deborah Zalesne, Racial Inequality in Contracting: Teaching Race as a Core
Value, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 23, 30 n.32 (2013) (“[W]hen the race of the parties is
explicit in an opinion, it appears that disproportionately the case involves a contract
defense such as unconscionability, and the African American party is portrayed as a victim
being taken advantage of by the dominant white party.”). See generally Cheryl L. Wade,
Attempting to Discuss Race in Business and Corporate Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 901, 904–05 (2003) (arguing that discussion of race should be a part of core
business and corporate law classes).
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justly well-known and illustrative of the field.162 Though not without
its critics,163 contract behavioralism is now publicly taking methodological victory laps.164
A set of the behavioral papers of particular interest relaxes the
assumption that people have “identical cognitive abilities.”165 Most of
this research focuses on the likelihood that firms will attempt to
exploit differences in consumers’ cognitive vulnerabilities. As Jeffrey
Rachlinski explained, such cognitive discrimination differs from more
traditional price discrimination.166 Ordinary price discrimination
works by charging consumers at their valuation—i.e., congestion
pricing. Cognitive discrimination, by contrast, “consists of an effort to
find consumers who probably should not engage in the transaction
and induce them to do so by exploiting cognitive errors that they are

162 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 608 (1998); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).
163 See, e.g., David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and StandardForm Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers,
and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 988–1003 (2006) (declining to adopt a
behavioralist approach in theorizing as to benefits of boilerplate provisions); Jason Scott
Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts
Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV.
857, 857 (2006) (presenting a rational choice theory as to how boilerplate contracts
“facilitate bargaining”); Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form
Contracts: Price Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 558–63
(2005) (critiquing Korobkin’s behavioralist approach). But see Russell Korobkin,
Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 783–85
(2005) (critiquing Klick).
164 See Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and
Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653 (2011).
165 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 208–09 (2006); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (constructing a
theory of business-to-business contracts where “the likelihood of systemic cognitive error”
is minimized, but realizing cognitive error is “more likely to afflict” contracts to which
consumers are parties); Korobkin, supra note 23, at 1212–13 (considering the import of
heterogeneous buyers); Korobkin, supra note 164, at 1671–73 (discussing the implications
of heterogeneity in consumers’ cognitive abilities); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky
Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts,
and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 753–55 (2009) (concluding that the
practical infeasibility of sorting people according to bias would stymie a program that
sought to debias those with the strongest biases).
166 Rachlinski, supra note 165, at 227–29.
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apt to make.”167 As Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar argued, marketers
at least conceivably could thus distort consumers’ buying habits.168
Notwithstanding the appealing rhetorical force of this literature,
there is surprisingly little evidence that firms do, in fact, attempt to
cognitively discriminate among consumers in the way that behavioralists have feared. Part of the reason might be that most common biases
(like over-optimism, endowment) are not easily demographically
sorted, making it difficult for regulators to effectively target their policymaking.169 And even if individuals’ errors were demographically
linked, regulatory solutions (“micro-targeted” disclosure) would seem
politically difficult or beyond regulators’ present capacities.170
In his recent paper, Digital Market Manipulation,171 Ryan Calo
points out that while targeting consumers based on individualized
traits (and identifying vulnerabilities) is difficult offline, online, with
streams of data and sophisticated algorithms to chop it, targeting is
normal business practice.172 Thus, firms can dynamically change website designs to fit consumers’ cognitive styles.173 They can also lull consumers to disclose more information about themselves through
carefully demographically targeted solicitations, and then sell such
“suckers lists” at a profit.174
This literature sets up the central normative worry that this
Article’s results evoke. There is evidence that firms change contract
167 Id. at 227; see also Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506–11
(2006) (describing how firms take advantage of “myopic” consumers by concealing salient
costs of long-term ownership).
168 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 723–26 (1999) (arguing that
market forces will drive product manufacturers to discover consumers’ cognitive biases and
use those biases to manipulate consumers’ risk assessments); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1439–67 (1999) (providing anecdotal evidence of firm manipulation
of consumer biases); see also Korobkin, supra note 164, at 1671–73 (focusing on the
regulatory implications for consumers having differential “cognitive capacity”).
169 See Williams, supra note 165, at 753–55 (discussing the infeasibility of sorting people
by level of bias).
170 Cf. Hosea H. Harvey, Opening Schumer’s Box: The Empirical Foundations of
Modern Consumer Finance Disclosure Law, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 59, 93–101 (2014)
(discussing shortcomings in the implementation of a tailored disclosure regime for
consumer credit).
171 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
172 Id. at 1015–18, 1020–22.
173 See id. at 1017 (citing John R. Hauser et al., Website Morphing, 28 MARKETING SCI.
202 (2009)) (describing research regarding website “morphing” based on individual users’
cognitive styles).
174 See id. at 1015 & n.115 (describing myriad ways firms seek to elicit information from
customers online).
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terms in response to changes in doctrine.175 And firms do change their
website interfaces to keep consumers engaged.176 Might firms, then,
exploit consumers’ diverging perspectives on contract by changing
how contracts look and are displayed?177 Or to put it differently, what
are the limits to marketing contracts qua contracts?
As a first cut, the case of “no contract” clauses provides a possible example of firms already, in effect, selling to consumers based on
views of contracting. The prevalence of such clauses on the market
strongly suggests that contract-based marketing is profitable and
desired. And there is at least suggestive evidence that no-contract
advertisements are used to attract older consumers. For instance,
Weight Watchers is a weight-loss firm that generally skews toward
older women.178 On its webpage, it advertises its product (in capitals)
as “NO ANNUAL CONTRACT. EASY TO CANCEL.”179 But,
interestingly, users of the firm’s iPhone application (who presumably
skew younger) must download the application before starting the service, and then must create an account, which describes the nature of
the service Weight Watchers provides. None of those pages advertised
(or even mentioned) that Weight Watchers requires “no annual
contract.”180
However, it turns out to be difficult to find other clean examples
of industries changing contracting contexts within a product category
to appeal to consumers, whether based on age or other individualized
attributes. Several imperfect examples follow:
175 See, e.g., Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 50, at 1003–04 (describing Dell’s
response to certain click-wrap decisions); see also Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note
49, at 270–74 (examining end-user license agreement changes in response to caselaw
evolution).
176 See generally Steven Bellman et al., Designing Marketplaces of the Artificial with
Consumers in Mind: Four Approaches to Understanding Consumer Behavior in Electronic
Environments, J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING, Winter 2006, at 29 (describing the
implications of four areas of consumer research for online retailer site design).
177 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 833–34 (2006) (describing how firms
“dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them to do” in
response to consumer expectations); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1414–15 (1983) (noting firms’ practice of altering warranty
coverage depending on consumer preferences).
178 See Michael R. Lowe et al., Weight-Loss Maintenance 1, 2 and 5 Years After
Successful Completion of a Weight-Loss Programme, 99 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 925, 927
(2008) (finding in a national sample of Weight Watchers’ clients that more than 70% were
women over the age of 45).
179 WEIGHT WATCHERS, https://www.weightwatchers.com/us/ (last visited May 24, 2016).
180 See Weight Watchers, WEIGHT WATCHERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (downloaded using
iTunes, updated Sept. 15, 2016).
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• Cruise ship companies target individual trips to different age
groups. Thus, the Rock & Roll Cruise targets older consumers
(“Contact Us Today 1-866-3OLDIES”).181 While you can book
online, customers are told that it’s ordinary to “choose to give
your credit card information directly to your booking agent.”182
Carnival Cruise Line, which caters to younger adults, has no
such disclaimer on its online contracting system.183
• State Farm’s term life insurance site strongly pushes discussion
with an agent on the phone, while their renters insurance
product can be easily purchased with a few clicks.184
• Sleepy’s (the mattress company) pushes telephone consultation
and commitment on the phone when ordering an adjustable
bed (skewed to elderly consumers), while offering a standard
online order system for a regular mattress in a box.185
• LifeAlert, the maker of the famous “I’ve fallen and I can’t get
up” bracelet, marketed to the elderly, does not sell online, but
rather directs webpage visitors to call the company to conclude
a contract.186
181 See CONCERTS AT SEA, http://www.concertsatsea.com (last visited Aug. 7, 2016)
(marketing an oldies-music themed cruise).
182 See Secure Booking Form, CONCERTS AT SEA, http://www.concertsatsea.com/booknow/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2016).
183 See CARNIVAL, http://www.carnival.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2016) (follow the
“Plan” tab to “Find a Cruise,” click on a cruise, in the top right corner click the “Book
Now” button, select the number of rooms and travelers, then select state of residency,
select a room and a “deal,” select a ship “section” and “deck,” then select a room, click on
the “Continue” button in the bottom right corner, enter passenger information, and select
a payment plan).
184 Compare Quote Summary for Term Life Insurance, STATE FARM, https://www
.statefarm.com/insurance/life/term-life (select state under “Get a Life Quote,” click “Go,”
and proceed with application until reaching “Your Quote Summary” page) (last visited
Sept. 27, 2016) (channeling customers to “Send to an Agent” by requiring completion of
additional steps, including identity verification, as prerequisites to applying online), with
Renters Insurance, STATE FARM, https://www.statefarm.com/insurance/home-and-property/
renters (enter zip code in the “Renters Quote” box on the right side of the webpage, then
enter personal information, including your residence’s “fire protection area,” enter
additional personal information, enter information regarding your residence, click the
“Buy Online Now!” button in the middle of the webpage) (last visited Aug. 8, 2016)
(requiring merely a disclosure about your apartment and then a “buy online” button).
185 Compare Adjustable Beds, SLEEPY’S, https://www.sleepys.com/adjustable-beds.html
(last visited Aug. 7, 2016) (“Want to learn more about adjustable beds? Call 1-866-7533797, Chat with a Mattress Professional or Visit a Store today!” then below that “SHOP
ADJUSTABLE BEDS”), with Mattress in a Box, SLEEPY’S, http://www.sleepys.com/
mattresses/mattress-in-a-box/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2016) (displaying a standard online
purchase system for a number of kinds of foam mattresses).
186 See Contact Us, LIFE ALERT, http://www.lifealert.net/customers/contact.html (last
visited Aug. 7, 2016).
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• Firms marketing matchmaking services to older Americans
seem to push contract to late in the consumption cycle (after
the firm has proven its bona fides by collecting demographic
information);187 programs like Tinder (skewing young) must be
installed on your smartphone, and the terms of service agreed
to, before you can tell them what strikes your fancy.188
These examples are incomplete in part because they are not truly
selling the same good with different contracting contexts to consumers
of different ages. Still they suggest that firms know that older consumers prefer traditional, paper, contracting formats, as my results
predict.
What of dynamic customization? For example, a firm that knows
it is dealing with a twenty-five-year-old consumer might default to
click-I-agree contracts very early in the transaction, even ones that do
not technically bind the consumer or the firm to anything, to demotivate comparison shopping and exit. By comparison those dealing with
a forty-five-year-old consumer for the same good might flash a different webpage that emphasizes the firm’s relational investment, and
encourage the consumer to call in with questions to a salesperson who
could consummate the deal. While such dynamic contracting environments might appear to be the stuff of law review speculation, there is
in fact a set of firms which optimize website design using individualized customer data and A/B testing.189
If we were to conclude that (1) this is a real phenomenon through
repeated experiments; and (2) firms were actually working to change
contracting contexts based on age and contract beliefs, should we act?
Unlike discrimination based on an individual’s cognitive heuristics, it
187 See, e.g., O UR T IME , http://www.ourtime.com/ (asking about demographic
preferences before login); Senior Dating, AARP (July 31, 2014), https://web.archive.org/
web/20140731202803/http://dating.aarp.org/ (accessed by searching “http://dating.aarp.org”
in the Internet Archive Wayback Machine) (reflecting a prior version of the AARP
website that, when visited by the author, required an AARP login to access the dating
section).
188 See Tinder, TINDER INC. (downloaded using iTunes, updated Sept. 20, 2016).
189 See
Personalization,
MONETATE,
http://www.monetate.com/products/
personalization/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2016) (describing the consulting service Monetate
provides to design customized webpages based on customer demographic profiles).
Monetate helps firms collect information about incoming customers (which can include age
if the customer has already shopped with the firm, but more typically will include
geographic data and associated shopping behavior). Telephone Interview with Nathan
Richter, Director of Client Solutions, Monetate (Mar. 28, 2016) (describing Monetate’s
services). Monetate also conducts A/B testing on different website designs, including
differences in the presentation of the purchasing contract. Id. Finally, it will help firms to
deploy personalized webpage experiences for each incoming prospective customer. Id. The
goal is (in the retail setting) to maximize revenue, which could mean the conversion rate of
surfers, or the likelihood that a buyer will buy an item with a higher margin. Id.
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does not strike me as obvious that discrimination based on contract
heuristic justifies regulation. Nor is it clear to me that differences
between contract “doctrine” and individuals’ understanding of it are
per se problematic.190 After all, the contracting context and presentation is just another product attribute (though one less salient than the
product’s price, color, or quality). Like most forms of advertising, we
should proceed with the default view that advertising is typically welfare enhancing.191
Thus, individualized contracting contexts are likely to be generally welfare maximizing.192 For example, a firm could use contracting
contexts to help reduce consumers’ uncertainty about whether their
consumer contracts are binding and morally legitimate. The result
might be that consumers who have entered into contracts that feel like
contracts might be less likely to breach them. That’s particularly
important in industries where IP is conveyed and the firm desperately
wants to reduce the likelihood that the consumers rip it and share it
with their friends.193 So we might imagine that firms will use targeted
contracts to control post-purchase behavior, without deceiving consumers about the content of their contracts or about their actual lawfulness. And that, in general, would be a good thing.
But there is a less savory potential use of individualized contracting: firms manipulating context to persuade individuals to under190 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, supra
note 90, at 1297–98 (questioning the import of the disjunct between doctrine and moral
psychology); Hoffman & Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, supra
note 90, at 444 (same); cf. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting
Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 108 (2013) (“[T]he relationship between
compliance and satisfaction with the substance of the criminal law is complicated and
difficult to predict, and . . . any relationship that does exist is not likely to be very strong.”).
But cf. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME 6 (1995)
(explaining that the distance between moral intuitions and law can reduce criminal law’s
“moral credibility”); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory:
Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1106–07 (2010/2011) (same).
191 The literature on the beneficent effect of advertising is vast. For two early works that
influenced the law and economics tradition, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629–33
(1981) (describing an indirect-information theory of advertising); Lee Benham, The Effect
of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337, 352 (1972) (finding that
prices for eyeglasses in states without restrictions on advertising were “substantially lower”
than prices in states with restrictions).
192 Cf. Ariel Porat & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1422–52 (2014) (showing how individualized
default rules can maximize welfare); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 57 (2013) (noting that “personalized default rules are the wave of the future”).
193 See Zev J. Eigen, An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions
8–9 (Oct. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2338559 (showing end-user license agreements were ineffective as currently
constituted in reducing cheating at an online task).
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stand the content and meaning of their contracts in ways that are not
in accord with the operative legal rules. Imagine two particular
scenarios.
First, what if firms sell consumers a good with a set of terms that
aren’t themselves enforceable, but choose a context (a digital one,
say) understanding that their particular consumers are particularly
likely to believe they are. The problem is that firms might be able to
insist (in the law’s shadow) that consumers comply with unenforceable
terms, simply because those consumers misconstrue the operative
rules. But that doesn’t strike me as a problem generated by age differences per se but rather by the underlying substantive law’s distance
from moral intuitions.
A different problem occurs if the firm makes the consumer feel
like a contract is binding but it is not, and the reason turns on some
problem with formation. For example, say what is being proposed is a
privacy clause that lacks consideration or is in fact illusory. Perhaps
firms make such clauses feel like they have weight (and thus protect
consumers) by making younger consumers click to agree to them, or
by providing them in paper-analogous formats to older consumers.
This would seem to introduce the possibility of firms exploiting the
disjunct between fairly arbitrary legal rules and moral intuitions in
ways that could harm consumers. The same is true in the no-contract
example, described above. There, intuitions about obligation lead
some consumers to make self-defeating choices, in ways that firms are
especially likely to be able to exploit.
With that subset of problems in mind, several doctrinal “fixes”
seem plausible.194 Needless to say, we ought to worry that any doctrinal rule based on subjective assent would be difficult to cabin—
after all, scholars have argued for decades that objective contract
theory ought to let in subjective expectations without success, largely
because opening the Pandora’s box of subjectivity is seen to unsettle
too much commercial practice.195 But if firms in fact manipulate par194 See KIM, supra note 3, at 201–03 (proposing that good faith could prevent
enforcement of wrap contracts that do not comport with user expectations).
195 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(commenting that it is not fatal to the enforcement of a contract that parties are mistaken
as to the legality of the agreement); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115 (4th
ed. 2004) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become
ascendant and courts universally accept it today. In the words of a distinguished federal
judge, ‘“intent” does not invite a tour through [plaintiff’s] cranium, with [plaintiff] as the
guide.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814
(7th Cir. 1987))); Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 343 (1997) (“The
reasonable person is the personification of the objective theory of contracts.”). Many
scholars have argued, however, that the objective formulation of contract law is
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ticular consumers to fail to shop around by causing them to wrongfully
understand their legal status, that context seems sufficiently narrow to
permit a doctrinal excuse. It would, in fact, smell like a classic case of
bad faith.196
Where the promisor has manipulated the context around obligation—and the promisor knows that the promisee’s behavior results
from their misperception—the promisor cannot insist on the terms of
the deal absent compelling evidence the promisee was not harmed.197
Thus, in the context where the promisee is made to feel bound but the
law also imposes obligation, there is no foul; but where the promisee
feels obligation absent law, or is led to make a bad choice to avoid
contractual obligation because of their identity, courts could avoid the
bargain.
C. Limitations and Future Research
This study is subject to several limitations and possible criticisms.
The first is common to scenario-based studies generally: Individuals
self-report their attitudes toward breach, obligation, or formation.
Because participants did not face real monetary incentives, perhaps
their responses were biased toward non-instrumental understandings
descriptively inaccurate, as it instead embodies values and characteristics of socially
dominant groups. See Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 644 (2010) (arguing that the objective theory of contracts
should be replaced by a dynamic approach incorporating social identity and background of
parties); Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1995) (noting that race appears in casebooks in
moments that put African Americans as victims, like in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility
Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029,
1035–37 (1992) (criticizing Posner’s formulation of the impossibility doctrine as grounded
in “stereotypical male virtues”); Kastely, supra note 25, at 293 (giving the objective theory
in contract law as an example of “race function[ing] as a foundational element of legal
doctrine”); Lu-in Wang, Negotiating the Situation: The Reasonable Person in Context, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2010) (arguing that considerations of the reasonable
person should take into account the ways in which social identity influences the
circumstances of bargaining); Williams, supra note 161, at 407 (describing how race affects
contracting relationships); Zalesne, supra note 161, at 35–39 (“The objective theory . . .
operate[s] functionally to conceal racial dimensions of contract law.”).
196 For a classic treatment, see generally Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195 (1968). Another possibility is classic offer and acceptance doctrine, instantiated by the
rule that not only must the offeror objectively manifest intent but also that the offerree (or
plaintiff) must subjectively believe in the contract she is proceeding under. See Embry v.
Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
197 Another possibility would start with the FTC’s authority under Section 5 to regulate
deceptive trade practices. I thank Woody Hartzog for bringing this point to my attention.
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of obligation.198 The second is particular to the context I was studying,
particularly online versus offline contracting. Because in fact all subjects saw the scenarios online, one might wonder whether they were
able to actually imagine offline variants in a concrete enough way to
draw inferences based on differences.199
Here, it is of some comfort that two nominally different subject
populations (mTurk and SSI) came to basically similar results—with
respect to the kind of people who are willing to fill out surveys online
for money, the results appear generally to hold. However, perhaps
those individuals are not representative of the public at large. That
said, I think the objection cuts for and not against the findings. If the
theory of the paper is that time spent online influences contract
schemas in ways that dispose individuals toward online contracts’
legitimacy, then in a way surveying the population of online survey
respondents will depress the results rather than intensify them. That
is, if these same experiments were to run using subjects offline, we
should expect larger effect sizes, not smaller ones.
It is a strength of the experimental set up that I used a nationally
representative pool, but it is a weakness that I have little information
about how that pool was recruited (SSI keeps such information close
to the vest for competitive reasons). It is also the case that given the
stakes, what I have said might not generalize to larger purchases, even
by individuals, which would imply that the preferences I have
unearthed are weakly held.
That all said, these experiments do show that in a very large,
diverse sample, differences in subjects’ age had a significant effect on
perceptions of contract, in ways not replicated between races, genders,
or ideologies. The novelty of that finding ought to spur further
research, both experimental (to offline samples, or ones which vary
party identity) and observational (to see whether firms, in fact, vary
contract terms turning on identity). If we were sure that identity-based
targeting for contractual structure and presentation was happening,
the case for normative intervention would be considerably
strengthened.
198 But cf. William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin, Attitudes and Persuasion, 57 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 345, 360 (2006) (“Because attitudes predict behavior, they are considered the
crown jewel of social psychology.”).
199 A different objection is that since some of the experiments suggested cash and others
digital payment methods, individuals’ different views of the “tangibility” of such payment
methods could have confounded the results. Cf. Siyu Wang & Xiangdong Qin, The Effect
of Digitalization on Penalty Payments: An Experimental Investigation, 8 J. NEUROSCI.
PSYCHOL. & ECON. 250, 260 (2015) (finding that subjects were less responsive to the effects
of digital payments, though the difference with cash decreased with experience).
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CONCLUSION
To summarize: Younger consumers understand contracts distinctly from older ones. Those views, which can be caricatured as the
de-moralification and formalization of contract, might eventually
become general. If that were to happen, we might need to reconsider
contract law’s current approach to problems of performance and
breach. Even in the short term, we ought to be wary that firms will
exploit these differences in ways that contract doctrine did not intend.
In either case, the findings here show the promise of a larger research
program into individual differences in contracting.
In thinking about this larger context, consider Professor Patricia
Williams’s famous description of the different approaches that she and
another professor (a white man) used when concluding an apartment
lease. He concluded the lease casually, handing over a cash deposit
without a written lease “to strangers with whom he had no ties other
than a few moments of pleasant conversation.”200 She, by contrast,
“signed a detailed, lengthily-negotiated, finely-printed lease firmly
establishing me as the ideal arm’s length transactor.”201 Williams
explains:
I . . . was raised to be acutely conscious of the likelihood that, no
matter what degree of professional or professor I became, people
would greet and dismiss my black femaleness as unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless, irrational and probably destitute.
Futility and despair are very real parts of my response. Therefore it
is helpful for me, even essential for me, to clarify boundary; to show
that I can speak the language of lease is my way of enhancing trust
of me in my business affairs.202

The data in this Article provides experimentally grounded support for Williams’s account of the role of identity in contract behavior.
She focuses on race; I turn attention to age and its relationship to
experiences with different kinds of contract. Obviously, further work
could expand beyond age to demographic differences that motivate
other distinctive views of contract. By focusing on the effects of individual differences on contract behavior, we would open up a new
approach to the problem of contractual obligation. We already live in
a world where firms have the motive and opportunity to use contract
as an individualized spur to consumption. The question this Article
poses is whether, and how, contract doctrine will respond.

200
201
202

Williams, supra note 161, at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR SUBJECTS’ LIKELIHOOD
AGREE THAT FORMATION HAPPENED AT AGREEMENT
Conditional
Assignment and
Age Controls
Written K
Condition
Age
Age *
Written Condition

Conditional
Assignment and
Age, Interaction
Terms

0.62***

(0.15)

0.77*

(0.44)

0.01**

(0.01)

0.01*
-0.00

(0.01)
(0.01)

TO

Conditional
Assignment and
Millennial,
Interaction Terms
0.57***

Millennial
-0.40
Millennial *
0.15
Written Condition
Black
-0.71*** (0.26) -0.72*** (0.26)
-0.76***
Male
0.06
(0.16)
0.06
(0.16)
0.08
Wealthy
-0.26
(0.22)
-0.26
(0.22)
-0.26
Conservative
0.18
(0.16)
0.17
(0.16)
0.18
Religious Scale
0.15*
(0.08)
0.15*
(0.08)
0.16*
Educated
0.04
(0.22)
0.03
(0.22)
0.05
Inexperienced
-0.14
(0.20)
-0.15
(0.20)
-0.15
Online Buyer
0.18**
(0.08)
0.18**
(0.08)
0.16**
Contract Scale
0.03
(0.06)
0.03
(0.06)
0.02
Constant
-2.29*** (0.46) -2.36*** (0.51)
-1.62***
Pseudo - R2
0.04
0.04
0.04
Observations
996
996
996
All regressions include time-in-study controls.
* are significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.

(0.19)

(0.26)
(0.32)
(0.26)
(0.16)
(0.22)
(0.16)
(0.08)
(0.22)
(0.20)
(0.08)
(0.06)
(0.36)
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TABLE 2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR SUBJECTS CLICKING 1 OR 2,
OUT OF 7, ON THE QUESTION “DO YOU THINK THAT
SALLY AND THE PHONE COMPANY HAVE A
LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT?”

Written K
Condition
Age
Age *
Written Condition

Conditional
Assignment and
Age Controls

Conditional
Assignment and
Age, Interaction
Terms

-0.92***

(0.24)

-2.29***

(0.72)

0.00

(0.01)

-0.01
0.03**

(0.01)
(0.01)

Conditional
Assignment and
Millennial,
Interaction Terms
-0.49*

Millennial
0.35
Millennial *
-1.46**
Written Condition
Black
0.55*
(0.29)
0.57*
(0.30)
0.59**
Male
0.21
(0.23)
0.20
(0.23)
0.21
Wealthy
-0.17
(0.34)
-0.17
(0.34)
-0.19
Conservative
0.32
(0.24)
0.33
(0.24)
0.34
Religious Scale
-0.17
(0.13)
-0.17
(0.13)
-0.18
Educated
-0.21
(0.35)
-0.18
(0.35)
-0.17
Inexperienced
0.48*
(0.26)
0.52**
(0.26)
0.52*
Online Buyer
0.21*
(0.12)
0.23*
(0.12)
0.24*
Contract Scale
0.07
(0.08)
0.07
(0.08)
0.06
Constant
-3.53*** (0.66) -3.24*** (0.68)
-3.80***
Pseudo - R2
0.06
0.07
0.07
Observations
996
996
996
All regressions include time-in-study controls.
* are significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.

(0.28)

(0.29)
(0.58)
(0.29)
(0.23)
(0.34)
(0.24)
(0.13)
(0.35)
(0.26)
(0.12)
(0.08)
(0.55)
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TABLE 3. ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR THE LIKERT
SCALE PRODUCED BY “DID SALLY BREACH?,”
WHERE 1 IS STRONGLY DISAGREE AND
6 IS STRONGLY AGREE
Conditional
Assignment and
Age Controls
Written K
Condition
Age
Age *
Written Condition
Millennial
Millennial *
Written Condition
Black
Male
Wealthy
Conservative
Religious Scale
Educated
Inexperienced
Online Buyer
Contract Scale
Cuts

Conditional
Assignment and
Age, Interaction
Terms

0.29**

(0.11)

0.50

(0.32)

0.01*

(0.00)

0.01*
-0.00

(0.00)
(0.01)

Conditional
Assignment and
Millennial,
Interaction Terms
0.27*

(0.14)

-0.20
0.06

(0.18)
(0.24)

-0.25
(0.17)
-0.25
(0.17)
-0.28
0.13
(0.12)
0.13
(0.12)
0.15
0.01
(0.17)
0.01
(0.17)
0.01
0.01
(0.13)
0.01
(0.13)
0.01
0.10
(0.07)
0.09
(0.07)
0.10
0.01
(0.17)
0.00
(0.17)
0.02
-0.09
(0.14)
-0.10
(0.14)
-0.10
0.14**
(0.06)
0.14**
(0.06)
0.13**
-0.00
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.04)
-0.01
-2.00
(0.38)
-1.47
(0.36)
-1.56
-1.28
(0.37)
-0.75
(0.35)
-0.84
-0.53
(0.37)
0.00
(0.34)
-0.10
0.81
(0.37)
1.34
(0.34)
1.24
2.46
(0.38)
2.99
(0.36)
2.90
Pseudo - R2
0.01
0.01
0.01
Observations
996
996
996
All regressions include time-in-study controls.
* are significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.

(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.13)
(0.07)
(0.17)
(0.14)
(0.06)
(0.04)
(0.29)
(0.28)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.29)
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TABLE 4. ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR THE LIKERT SCALE
PRODUCED BY “HOW FAIR IS IT THAT SAFERX,” WHERE
1 IS VERY UNFAIR AND 7 IS VERY FAIR
Conditional
Assignment and
Age Controls
Digital K
Condition
Age
Age *
Digital Condition
Millennial
Millennial *
Digital Condition
Black
Male
Wealthy
Conservative
Religious Scale
Educated
Inexperienced
Online Buyer
Contract Scale
Cuts

Conditional
Assignment and
Age, Interaction
Terms

-0.14

(0.11)

0.45

(0.31)

-0.00

(0.00)

0.01
-0.01**

(0.01)
(0.01)

0.12
0.08
0.12
-0.06
0.06
0.09
-0.17
0.11*
0.08*
-1.05
-0.19
0.43
0.89
1.66
2.72

Conditional
Assignment and
Millennial,
Interaction Terms
-0.32**

(0.14)

-0.12
0.48**

(0.17)
(0.23)

(0.17)
0.11
(0.17)
0.11
(0.12)
0.09
(0.12)
0.11
(0.16)
0.14
(0.16)
0.17
(0.12)
-0.07
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.07)
0.06
(0.07)
0.07
(0.16)
0.08
(0.16)
0.10
(0.14)
-0.15
(0.14)
-0.17
(0.06)
0.11*
(0.06)
0.11*
(0.04)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.07
-1.12
(0.37)
-0.76
(0.34)
-0.25
(0.37)
0.10
(0.34)
0.37
(0.37)
0.72
(0.34)
0.83
(0.37)
1.19
(0.34)
1.61
(0.38)
1.96
(0.34)
2.67
(0.39)
3.02
(0.36)
Pseudo - R2
0.01
0.01
0.01
Observations
996
996
996
All regressions include time-in-study controls.
* are significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.

(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.07)
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.06)
(0.04)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.29)

December 2016]
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TABLE 5. ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR LEGAL
MORAL APPROPRIATENESS OF STORE’S CONDUCT; LOGISTIC
REGRESSION FOR ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACT WHERE 1 IS
IDENTIFIED IF SUBJECTS THOUGHT THE CONTRACT WAS
ENFORCEABLE OR DEFINITELY ENFORCEABLE, 0 OTHERWISE

AND

Legally
Morally
Enforceable?
Appropriate?
Appropriate?
Age
-0.14***
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.00)
Genius
0.64***
(0.13)
-0.03
(0.12)
0.62***
(0.14)
Black
-0.01
(0.17)
-0.25
(0.17)
-0.35*
(0.21)
Male
0.10
(0.12)
0.08
(0.12)
-0.02
(0.14)
Wealthy
0.33**
(0.17)
0.08
(0.17)
0.33*
(0.19)
Conservative
0.15
(0.12)
0.38***
(0.13)
0.20
(0.15)
Religious Scale
0.17***
(0.07)
0.24***
(0.07)
0.26***
(0.08)
Educated
0.10
(0.16)
-0.19
(0.17)
-0.31
(0.20)
Inexperienced
-0.02
(0.14)
-0.14
(0.14)
-0.33*
(0.18)
Online Buyer
0.02
(0.06)
-0.19***
(0.06)
0.13*
(0.07)
Contract Scale
-0.02
(0.04)
0.07*
(0.04)
0.04
(0.05)
-2.00***
(0.41)
(0.34)
-2.63
(0.34)
Cuts/Constant
-1.80
(0.33)
-1.65
(0.33)
-0.88
(0.33)
-0.70
(0.33)
-0.15
(0.33)
0.17
(0.33)
0.72
(0.35)
1.38
(0.35)
2.29
2
Pseudo - R
0.02
0.02
0.06
Observations
996
996
996
All regressions include time-in-study controls.
* are significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.
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TABLE 6. LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD
TAKING THE MONTHLY CONTRACT

“No Contract” Condition
Millennial
Millennial *
“No Contract” Condition

Conditional and Interaction Specification
0.62***
(0.17)
0.16
(0.21)
-0.69**
(0.28)

Black
0.11
(0.21)
Male
-0.42***
(0.14)
Wealthy
-0.14
(0.20)
Conservative
0.00
(0.15)
Religious Scale
-0.05
(0.08)
Educated
-0.37*
(0.19)
Inexperienced
-0.22
(0.17)
Online Buyer
0.05
(0.07)
Contract Scale
-0.08*
(0.05)
Constant
0.67**
(0.32)
2
Pseudo - R
0.03
Observations
996
Regression includes time-in-study control.
* are significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.
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